Saudi-led coalition strikes southern Yemen after STC leader al-Zubaidi flees

Lead

On 7 January 2026, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition carried out air strikes in Yemen’s Dhale governorate after saying Southern Transitional Council (STC) leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi fled Aden and failed to board a plane bound for Riyadh. The coalition said it struck at around 04:00 local time (01:00 GMT) to disable forces it said al-Zubaidi had mobilised and prevent an escalation. The STC did not immediately comment, while Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council removed al-Zubaidi and asked the attorney general to open an investigation. The strikes add a new flashpoint to a conflict that widened with an STC offensive in December 2025.

Key Takeaways

• The coalition says al-Zubaidi was due to fly to Riyadh on 6 January 2026 but “fled to an unknown location” and did not board the plane; his whereabouts remain unknown.
• Coalition forces reported the mobilisation of a large STC force leaving Aden around midnight and located in Dhale; strikes were carried out at 04:00 local time (01:00 GMT).
• The coalition described the strikes as “preemptive” to disable armoured and combat vehicles and munitions it said were being moved to escalate hostilities.
• The STC, backed by the United Arab Emirates, seized wide areas in southern Yemen in December, including Hadramout and Mahra provinces; some areas were retaken by government forces with Saudi air support.
• Rashad al-Alimi, head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, announced al-Zubaidi’s removal from the council for “committing high treason” and requested a legal probe by the attorney general.
• Riyadh previously conducted strikes on the port of Mukalla on 30 December 2025, citing a UAE-linked shipment; Abu Dhabi denied weapons were involved and later said it would end its counterterrorism mission in Yemen.
• An STC delegation — excluding al-Zubaidi — departed for Riyadh in the early hours of 7 January to attend talks on southern demands.

Background

The Southern Transitional Council formed as a political and armed movement pressing for greater autonomy or independence for southern Yemen, a region formerly part of the independent South Yemen state before 1990. The STC and its leaders have at times been allied with the internationally recognised Yemeni government against the Houthi movement that controls large parts of the north, but the council’s agenda has diverged sharply from the central government’s since 2017 and especially in recent months.

In December 2025 the STC launched a rapid advance into key southern provinces, taking control of broad swaths including Hadramout and Mahra. Those moves broke a prolonged stalemate in the south and put frontline authority near the Saudi border, raising security concerns in Riyadh. The United Arab Emirates has been identified as a backer of the STC, while Saudi Arabia has supported the internationally recognised government; those differing priorities have complicated Gulf efforts to stabilise Yemen.

Main Event

According to a coalition statement released early on 7 January 2026, Aidarous al-Zubaidi was scheduled to depart Aden on 6 January for talks in Riyadh but did not board the flight and instead moved to an unknown location. The coalition said it received information that al-Zubaidi had organised a sizeable force composed of armoured and combat vehicles, heavy and light weapons, and munitions. That force reportedly left Aden at about midnight and was later located in the Dhale governorate.

The coalition said it launched strikes at about 04:00 local time (01:00 GMT) aimed at disabling those forces and thwarting what it described as an attempt to escalate the conflict. There was no immediate confirmation of casualties or detailed damage assessments released by the coalition. Local reporting and STC channels had not issued a formal response at the time the coalition’s statement was published.

Separately, the STC sent a delegation to Riyadh for talks on ending the fighting between the council and the internationally recognised government; the coalition said the delegation left Yemen in the early hours of 7 January without al-Zubaidi. Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alimi announced that al-Zubaidi had been removed from the council and accused him of high treason, asking the attorney general to pursue legal action.

Analysis & Implications

These developments deepen the fragmentation of the anti-Houthi camp in Yemen. The STC’s December gains represented a strategic shift, seizing territory that had been under central-government control and altering frontlines near the Saudi border. Riyadh’s decision to strike in Dhale demonstrates concern that southern consolidation under the STC could produce a separate, armed entity outside the framework of the internationally recognised government.

The incidents also reflect broader Gulf politics: Abu Dhabi’s support for the STC has been a recurring source of tension with Riyadh, which views the unity of Yemen as critical to its own border security. The December 30 Mukalla strike and subsequent UAE denial about the nature of the contested shipment illustrate how conflicting intelligence and public narratives can heighten mistrust between partners working on Yemen.

On a domestic level, al-Zubaidi’s reported flight and removal from the Presidential Leadership Council reduce the prospects that he will be able to participate meaningfully in Riyadh-mediated talks, at least in the short term. That weakens incentives for a negotiated settlement to the south-versus-central-government dispute and raises the risk of localized clashes with humanitarian and displacement consequences for civilians in southern governorates.

Comparison & Data

The table summarises the territorial shifts since December 2025 and the immediate government and coalition response in early January 2026. While control in some provinces shifted back to government forces with Saudi support, the STC retains organisational capacity and political claims that complicate restoration of central authority. Accurate, on-the-ground control lines remain fluid and subject to rapid change as forces redeploy.

Reactions & Quotes

Officials from the Saudi-led coalition framed the strikes as a necessary step to prevent renewed fighting and a wider southern insurrection. Their public messaging emphasises preemption and the protection of the internationally recognised government’s authority.

“He fled to an unknown location,”

Saudi-led coalition statement

The coalition used this phrasing to explain why the strikes were undertaken without al-Zubaidi present. The language underlines the coalition’s claim that the movement of armed units from Aden represented a direct threat needing immediate interdiction.

Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council moved quickly to remove al-Zubaidi from its ranks and to formalise a criminal inquiry. The council presented the action as a legal and political consequence of what it characterised as a betrayal of national unity.

“Removed from the council for committing high treason,”

Rashad al-Alimi, Presidential Leadership Council

Al-Alimi’s statement signals that the central government intends to pursue institutional and judicial routes against STC leadership if it is seen to have acted against state interests. That choice frames the dispute not only as a military confrontation but also as a contest over legality and legitimacy.

Outside Gulf capitals, reactions have been cautious. Abu Dhabi earlier denied accusations related to the Mukalla shipment and announced the end of its counterterrorism mission in Yemen, a move that has changed the operational landscape on the ground.

“The shipment did not contain weapons,”

Abu Dhabi statement (December 2025)

That denial and Abu Dhabi’s subsequent withdrawal from its named mission have left a vacuum in some areas of southern Yemen and complicated coordination among allies backing different Yemeni actors. The divergence in public narratives between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has heightened diplomatic sensitivity around any new military action.

Unconfirmed

• The precise location and condition of Aidarous al-Zubaidi after he reportedly “fled” remain unverified by independent sources.
• The exact size, composition and armament levels of the STC force said to have left Aden are not independently confirmed.
• Allegations about a UAE-linked weapons shipment to Mukalla and any direct UAE role in the December 2025 or January 2026 movements remain contested and lack conclusive public proof.

Bottom Line

The strikes in Dhale on 7 January 2026 underscore how quickly Yemen’s already-fractured conflict can shift when political negotiations falter and military actors reposition. Al-Zubaidi’s reported flight and removal from the Presidential Leadership Council complicate Riyadh’s mediation efforts and reduce prospects for a near-term political settlement between the STC and the central government.

For regional actors, the incident highlights the tension between Saudi concerns about border security and Abu Dhabi’s long-standing ties to southern actors. Diplomats in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will likely face increased pressure to manage competing priorities to prevent further fragmentation of the anti-Houthi coalition.

Observers should watch for independent verification of al-Zubaidi’s whereabouts, follow-up statements from the STC, and any changes in troop deployments across Aden, Dhale, Hadramout and Mahra — all of which will shape whether diplomatic channels can regain traction.

Sources

• Al Jazeera — International news outlet reporting on the coalition statement and related developments.