Romanian President Nicușor Dan told POLITICO that a resurgent U.S. foreign policy strand—summed up by reports that President Trump said, “I don’t need international law”—is pushing economics ahead of principles and leaving European capitals uncertain about long-term security choices. Dan warned this transactional posture has recalibrated allied expectations and complicated cooperation on issues from Ukraine to trade. His comments reflect growing concern in Eastern Europe about predictable commitments from Washington and how the EU should respond strategically. The interview underlines a widening disconnect the Romanian president says both sides must address to avoid policy paralysis.
Key takeaways
- Romanian President Nicușor Dan told POLITICO on Dec 22 that U.S. policy under President Trump privileges economic leverage over legal or moral constraints, quoting the reported phrase, “I don’t need international law.”
- The shift has, according to Dan, frozen debates in some EU capitals about security guarantees, complicating coordinated responses to Russia and the war in Ukraine.
- Romania, a NATO member since 2004 and a frontline state bordering Ukraine, views predictable U.S. commitments as central to deterrence and regional stability.
- European officials and analysts worry transactional diplomacy reduces the reliability of alliances and raises short-term economic bargaining at the expense of long-term security frameworks.
- Dan urged better mutual understanding between the U.S. and EU to prevent strategic drift and preserve the rules-based order that underpins European security and trade.
Background
Since 2016, U.S. foreign policy has oscillated between traditional alliance-building and more transactional, interest-first approaches. The latter emphasizes bilateral bargaining over multilateral institutions and has led to tensions with partners who rely on predictable, law-based cooperation. In Eastern Europe, memories of Russian aggression and hybrid warfare have heightened the value placed on consistent security assurances from Washington and NATO.
Romania, which joined NATO in 2004, sits at the intersection of these debates: it is both an EU member and a NATO frontline state with direct interest in deterrence measures. Political leaders in Bucharest and other capitals watch U.S. rhetoric and policy signals closely because they shape force posture, intelligence cooperation and investment decisions. The debate is not purely ideological; it affects procurement, basing, and the calculus of how much risk governments will accept in resisting coercion by larger powers.
Main event
In a Dec 22 interview with POLITICO, President Nicușor Dan framed recent U.S. signals as a turn toward economic bargaining that sidelines legal and normative constraints. He argued that when leaders prioritize short-term economic leverage, European decision-making becomes reactive, as capitals wait for clear American positions before committing to policies on arms, sanctions or diplomatic initiatives. That hesitancy, Dan said, yields a strategic freeze: important debates are deferred and coordinated responses diluted.
Dan connected the phenomenon to concrete security concerns in the region, noting that unpredictability from a principal security partner forces smaller states to consider unilateral hedging or deeper ties with other actors to preserve their interests. He cautioned that such hedging risks fragmenting Western consensus and undermining collective deterrence. While stressing the need for pragmatic economic ties with the U.S., Dan emphasized that economics should not entirely eclipse legal norms and alliance commitments.
The Romanian president also called for improved dialogue between Brussels and Washington so both sides better grasp each other’s incentives and constraints. He urged clearer mechanisms for translating U.S. economic or diplomatic offers into stable, enforceable security arrangements that European publics and governments can rely on. Dan said this mutual understanding is essential to keep cooperation from reverting to episodic bargains driven by immediate gains.
Analysis & implications
First, a sustained tilt toward transactional diplomacy can erode predictability—the currency of alliances. When partners cannot forecast commitments, they discount future cooperation and may invest in alternative security measures, raising costs for everyone. For NATO, diminished predictability could translate into more onus on European members to raise defense spending and posture, accelerating debates over strategic autonomy.
Second, economics-first approaches reshape leverage. States with market access or investment capacity can extract concessions without legal constraints, weakening multilateral dispute resolution and incentivizing coercive commerce. Over time, this dynamic could hollow out international institutions designed to manage trade, investment, and security disputes, with particular harm to smaller allies that rely on collective rules for protection.
Third, the political fallout within the EU may be profound. Governments facing domestic pressure to safeguard jobs and investment may prioritize immediate economic wins over shared foreign policy positions, splintering unified sanctions or diplomatic initiatives. The result is a fragmented European foreign policy that external adversaries can exploit, complicating coordinated responses to aggression in places like Ukraine.
Finally, however, transactional engagement is not automatically catastrophic: it can yield concrete, rapid deals when paired with transparent frameworks and enforceable guarantees. The challenge for Europe is to convert short-term U.S. offers into durable instruments—legal, institutional or military—that bind parties beyond the next political cycle. Without such translation, Western security architecture risks becoming a patchwork of ephemeral bargains.
Comparison & data
| Feature | Rules-based order | Transactional doctrine |
|---|---|---|
| Decision horizon | Long-term, institutionally anchored | Short-term, bilateral leverage |
| Dispute resolution | Multilateral mechanisms & law | Bilateral negotiation & power |
| Predictability | Higher with enforcement | Lower; depends on current incentives |
The table highlights how transactional approaches shorten decision horizons and reduce the role of multilateral dispute mechanisms. For EU members that rely on predictable alliance behavior—especially those near conflict zones—this shift raises the price of deterrence and complicates long-range planning for defense procurement and civilian resilience.
Reactions & quotes
Several actors responded to the interview’s theme, reflecting a mix of alarm and calls for clearer coordination.
“Economics beat morals in Trump’s new world,”
Nicușor Dan, President of Romania (to POLITICO)
Dan used this formulation to underline his central argument: that economic calculations have overtaken commitments to legal norms, with consequences for alliance cohesion. He said the effect is visible in slower policy decisions and a rise in contingency planning among EU states.
“Allies need predictability to sustain deterrence,”
EU security analyst (anonym.)
An EU analyst, speaking on background, stressed that credible deterrence depends on foreseeable behavior from major powers. The analyst warned that without institutionalized guarantees, short-term bargains will leave gaps adversaries can test.
Unconfirmed
- Whether President Trump explicitly used the exact phrase “I don’t need international law” in an official address remains a matter of public reporting and context rather than an independently verified transcript for this piece.
- The extent to which specific U.S. policy shifts have already prompted concrete changes in European military deployments or procurement plans is reported by some sources but not fully confirmed in available public documents.
Bottom line
President Dan’s warning reflects a broader anxiety in Europe: that when economic bargaining eclipses legal and normative constraints, the predictability that underwrites alliances weakens. For frontline states like Romania, the immediate worry is deterrence credibility; for the EU as a whole, the risk is a more fragmented foreign policy and increased cost of collective defense.
Closing the gap will require deliberate translation of transactional offers into durable guarantees—legal instruments, institutional frameworks or credible military commitments—that survive political cycles. Without such scaffolding, Europe faces a future where short-term gains erode the long-term foundations of security and cooperation.
Sources
- POLITICO.eu — media report and interview with Romanian President Nicușor Dan