On 26 January 2026 Ethiopia’s Ministry of Health declared the country’s first-ever Marburg virus disease (MVD) outbreak over, following two complete incubation periods (42 days) since the last confirmed case died and received a safe, dignified burial on 14 December 2025. The ministry reported a cumulative 19 cases as of 25 January 2026: 14 laboratory-confirmed (including nine deaths) and five probable cases (all fatal). Authorities traced 857 contacts, all of whom completed 21 days of monitoring by 25 January. WHO and partners provided technical, operational and financial support during the response.
Key takeaways
- Outbreak end declared on 26 January 2026 after a 42-day countdown following the last confirmed death and burial on 14 December 2025.
- Total cases: 19 (14 confirmed, five probable); reported deaths: 14 (nine among confirmed cases), with a confirmed-case fatality rate of 64.3%.
- Geographic spread: cases reported from Jinka, Malle and Dasench woredas in the South Ethiopia Region and Hawassa in Sidama Region.
- Contacts: 857 people listed for follow-up (760 in South Ethiopia Region, 97 in Sidama Region); all completed 21-day monitoring by 25 January 2026.
- Laboratory testing: 3,800 samples tested for filovirus as of 5 January 2026, including molecular confirmation by the Ethiopian Public Health Institute’s National Reference Laboratory.
- Health system measures: two hospitals designated as treatment centres, mobile laboratory deployed to Jinka, and strengthened IPC, surveillance and risk-communication activities.
- WHO role: policy, technical and operational support across response pillars plus emergency supplies, deployed experts and assistance on transition planning.
Background
Marburg virus disease is a severe viral haemorrhagic fever caused by Marburg and Ravn viruses. Transmission typically begins with zoonotic spillover from Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) and continues through direct contact with infectious bodily fluids, contaminated fomites, or during care and burial practices where infection prevention and control (IPC) is insufficient. Clinical onset follows an incubation of two to 21 days and ranges from high fever and gastrointestinal symptoms to bleeding, shock and organ failure in severe cases; historically reported case fatality rates have ranged from 24% to 88% depending on outbreak context and supportive care.
This event marked Ethiopia’s first recorded MVD outbreak. Globally, 19 prior Marburg outbreaks have been documented, most recently in the United Republic of Tanzania between January and March 2025. There are no licensed treatments or vaccines for Marburg disease yet, though supportive care reduces mortality and several candidate vaccines and therapeutics remain under investigation under WHO-coordinated efforts.
Main event
The outbreak response began after molecular confirmation of Marburg virus on 14 November 2025 in Jinka town, South Ethiopia Region. The first known case developed symptoms on 23 October 2025 and presented to the local general hospital on 24 October with vomiting, anorexia and abdominal cramps; subsequent diagnostic testing at EPHI identified MARV. Case investigations later linked additional confirmed and probable cases to clusters in Jinka, neighbouring woredas Malle and Dasench, and a case reported from Hawassa in Sidama Region.
Authorities activated national and regional incident-management structures, established a National Taskforce at the Ministry of Health and launched a costed three-month response plan. Surveillance activities were intensified with active case searches, contact tracing, community surveillance and enhanced screening at priority points of entry. Two treatment centres were designated and staffed, and a mobile laboratory was deployed to accelerate diagnostics in Jinka.
Infection prevention and control protocols were reinforced in health facilities, and risk communication and community engagement (RCCE) teams conducted dialogues, monitored misinformation, and mobilized trusted local networks. Safe and dignified burial procedures were applied; the last confirmed case died on 14 December 2025 and was buried according to WHO guidance, marking the start of the 42-day countdown before the outbreak could be declared over.
Analysis & implications
The rapid declaration of outbreak end reflects successful case finding, contact follow-up and community engagement: 857 contacts completed 21-day monitoring and no new confirmed cases were detected during the 42-day period. Nevertheless, the outbreak underscores persistent vulnerabilities in zoonotic spillover-prone settings where human activity intersects bat habitats. Strengthening One Health surveillance at caves, mines and other bat-colony sites will be crucial to detect and prevent future spillovers.
Health-system capacity gains from this response—expanded laboratory reach, designated treatment centres, trained IPC teams and improved RCCE—offer a platform for sustained preparedness if institutionalized. However, resource constraints and competing health priorities risk erosion of these gains; planned integration of MVD response activities into essential services will determine durability.
Regionally, the event highlights cross-border risk in the Horn of Africa where population movement and porous borders can challenge containment. WHO’s advice against travel or trade restrictions reflects both the limited geographic spread of this outbreak and the negative socioeconomic impacts of blanket measures, but it presumes ongoing vigilance at points of entry and continued cross-border coordination.
Comparison & data
| Metric | Ethiopia (to 25 Jan 2026) |
|---|---|
| Confirmed cases | 14 |
| Probable cases | 5 |
| Total cases | 19 |
| Reported deaths | 14 |
| Confirmed-case fatality rate | 64.3% |
| Contacts followed | 857 (760 South Ethiopia, 97 Sidama) |
| Samples tested (to 5 Jan 2026) | 3,800 |
The table summarizes core outbreak metrics reported by the Ministry of Health and EPHI. Compared with historical MVD outbreaks (CFR range 24–88%), Ethiopia’s confirmed-case CFR of 64.3% sits within the documented range; timely supportive care likely influenced individual outcomes. Continued routine data publication will be important for trend analysis and operational planning.
Reactions & quotes
Officials and technical partners emphasized multi-sector coordination and community engagement as decisive in controlling this outbreak.
“The coordinated response—deploying laboratory capacity to Jinka, designating treatment centres and mobilizing community teams—was essential to interrupt transmission and protect lives,”
Ministry of Health, Ethiopia (official statement)
The ministry framed operational steps and the 42-day clearance as adherence to WHO recommendations, while stressing the need for continued surveillance.
“WHO provided technical and operational assistance across all pillars, including laboratory supplies and expert deployments to support rapid detection and response,”
World Health Organization (country office)
Public-health experts highlighted the persistent risk of zoonotic spillovers and the importance of sustaining investments in preparedness.
“This outbreak demonstrates that building local diagnostic and IPC capacity now pays dividends for future threats; the challenge is making those gains permanent,”
Independent epidemiologist (expert comment)
Unconfirmed
- Exact source of the initial zoonotic spillover has not been confirmed; investigations into potential exposure to bat colonies are ongoing.
- There may have been undetected mild or asymptomatic infections not captured by surveillance, though no additional cases emerged during the 42-day clearance period.
- Field effectiveness of candidate vaccines and therapeutics for Marburg in this outbreak context remains unassessed and is not established.
Bottom line
The Ethiopian declaration that the Marburg outbreak has ended is supported by standard WHO criteria and by the reported completion of contact follow-up and negative surveillance during the 42-day period. Operational successes—rapid laboratory confirmation, mobile diagnostics, designated treatment centres and intensive RCCE—helped contain transmission in affected districts.
Risk, however, persists: future spillovers from bat reservoirs and gaps in long-term surveillance or IPC capacity could allow re-emergence. The priority for authorities and partners is to consolidate response gains into routine public-health systems, strengthen One Health surveillance at animal–human interfaces, and maintain community engagement to detect and respond rapidly if new cases appear.