Lead
The final remaining strategic arms limitation between the United States and Russia is set to expire Thursday, removing formal caps on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. Russian leaders have offered short-term adherence if Washington reciprocates, but the U.S. administration has not committed to an extension. Experts warn the lapse could trigger an unconstrained arms competition—potentially pulling China into a wider nuclear buildup—and raise global instability risks.
Key Takeaways
- New START, signed in 2010, limited each side to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers).
- The treaty was extended once from its original 2021 expiry for five years; it now faces expiration on Thursday with no new deal in place.
- Russia offered to honor New START limits for one additional year if the U.S. does the same; the U.S. response remains noncommittal.
- On-site inspections envisioned by the pact halted in 2020 and Moscow suspended participation in February 2023 while saying it would respect the caps.
- Analysts warn that without New START, deployed arsenals on each side could rise for the first time in about 35 years, increasing the chance of an arms race that could involve China.
- Previous arms control accords—SALT I (1972), the 1972 ABM Treaty, and the 1987 INF Treaty—have been eroded or ended, narrowing formal limits on strategic systems.
- U.S. proposals for new missile defenses (the so-called Golden Dome) and public talk of resuming nuclear tests have added to Kremlin concerns about strategic stability.
Background
New START was signed in 2010 by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, establishing numerical ceilings—1,550 warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems—and a verification regime that included reciprocal on-site inspections. The treaty was due to expire in 2021 but was extended for five years; that extension is now coming to its scheduled end. In practice, the verification measures were interrupted in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic and never fully resumed.
Arms control between Moscow and Washington has a long lineage dating to the Cold War: SALT I in 1972 began formal limits, while the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty constrained strategic defenses until the United States withdrew in 2001. The 1987 INF Treaty eliminated an entire class of land-based intermediate-range missiles until its termination in 2019. Those ruptures have already narrowed the architecture that once restrained competition.
Main Event
The immediate development is the scheduled expiration of New START on Thursday. Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly offered in September to abide by the treaty’s numerical ceilings for an additional year as a bridging measure for negotiations, but he framed that offer contingent on U.S. reciprocity. The Biden administration has been noncommittal about an extension; an unnamed White House official told reporters that President Donald Trump would make arms-control decisions “on his own timeline.”
Moscow had formally suspended its participation in New START in February 2023, citing concerns about U.S. inspections while relations were strained over the war in Ukraine; nevertheless, Kremlin officials said Russia would continue to respect the warhead caps. Verification activity, however, has not returned to pre-2020 levels, weakening transparency between the sides.
Russian leaders have heightened rhetoric and policy moves since 2022, including a 2024 revision to Moscow’s nuclear doctrine that lowered the threshold for weapons use and repeated public displays of nuclear capability. U.S. officials and analysts say Russia has continued to develop new systems—among them long-range cruise missiles and underwater systems—that complicate calculations about strategic balance. Meanwhile, Beijing has resisted joining trilateral limits, arguing its arsenal is smaller and that it will not accept the same constraints as the two superpowers.
Analysis & Implications
The treaty’s expiration would remove legal limits that have structured planning and force levels for more than a decade. Analysts warn this may incentivize both sides to deploy more systems to preserve deterrence or to gain leverage in future talks; one NGO noted that deployed warhead counts could climb for the first time in decades. Absent inspections and data exchanges, each capital would have less certitude about the other’s posture, raising risks of miscalculation during crises.
Beyond bilateral effects, the lapse could reshape global nuclear dynamics. China, which has a smaller but growing arsenal, has declined to accept caps proportional to U.S. and Russian numbers; without a bilateral anchor, Washington may press Beijing to enter negotiations, something Beijing has resisted. Observers warn this triangular dynamic could produce a broader, faster buildup—especially if major powers perceive defensive systems like missile shields as destabilizing.
Economically and technologically, a renewed arms competition would drive higher defense spending, accelerated deployment of novel delivery systems, and greater research into hypersonics, cyber-enabled early warning, and missile defenses. Those investments could in turn feed strategic insecurity: defenses prompt offensive counters designed to overwhelm them, accelerating qualitative and quantitative escalation at lower fiscal cost than building robust, survivable defenses.
Comparison & Data
| Treaty | Year | Primary limits or outcome |
|---|---|---|
| SALT I | 1972 | First limits on strategic systems, set framework for later deals |
| ABM Treaty | 1972 (U.S. exit 2001) | Restricted national missile defenses; U.S. withdrawal removed that barrier |
| INF Treaty | 1987 (ended 2019) | Banned land-based missiles 500–5,500 km; termination returned those ranges to play |
| New START | 2010 (extended once) | Caps: 1,550 deployed warheads; 700 deployed delivery systems; verification by on-site inspections |
The table shows how successive treaty dissolutions have narrowed formal constraints. With each removal—ABM in 2001, INF in 2019, and now potentially New START—key technical and political restraints on deployment and modernization have weakened, changing the incentives facing military planners and diplomats.
Reactions & Quotes
Officials in Moscow stressed the risks of lifting limits. The Kremlin warned that a world without caps would be “more dangerous,” arguing that predictability between the two nuclear powers is a stabilizing factor.
“We’re at the point now where the two sides could, with the expiration of this treaty, for the first time in about 35 years, increase the number of nuclear weapons that are deployed on each side.”
Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association (NGO)
U.S. and allied commentators urged caution. A former U.S. chief negotiator said a short extension would not prevent the United States from responding to China’s buildup but would maintain transparency and reduce near-term risk.
“A one-year extension of New START limits would not prejudice any of the vital steps that the United States is taking to respond to the Chinese nuclear buildup.”
Rose Gottemoeller, former U.S. chief negotiator (former NATO deputy secretary-general)
Russian political leaders have signaled they would react to perceived threats to parity. Deputy head of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev framed U.S. defensive programs as prompts to restore balance if necessary.
“If we are not heard, we act proportionately seeking to restore parity.”
Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Head of Russia’s Security Council (official)
Unconfirmed
- Whether the U.S. will agree to a one-year reciprocal extension if Russia honors its unilateral offer remains unconfirmed and subject to internal administration decision-making.
- Reports that the U.S. will resume full-scale nuclear explosive testing have not been confirmed; U.S. Energy Department statements suggest any planned activities would not include nuclear detonations.
- The timeline and scope of any future trilateral negotiations involving China are uncertain; Beijing has so far resisted joining U.S.-Russia limits on the same terms.
Bottom Line
The immediate lapse of New START would remove a major pillar of strategic restraint between Washington and Moscow, reducing transparency and increasing incentives for deployment and hedging. In the near term, that creates heightened risk of misperception and arms accumulation—outcomes that can elevate the danger of crises spiraling in ways that complicate crisis management.
Longer term, the expiration could catalyze broader dynamics: greater defense spending, quicker fielding of advanced delivery systems, and new diplomatic efforts to forge either bilateral or trilateral regimes. Absent a negotiated successor or interim extension, the world faces a more ambiguous and potentially more volatile strategic environment.
Sources
- The Associated Press (news report)
- Arms Control Association (non-governmental organization/advocacy)
- RAND Corporation (think tank)
- The Kremlin (official statements)