Lead
Opening the Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz warned that the post‑war rules‑based international order “no longer exists,” urging Europeans to prepare for sacrifice and to repair transatlantic trust. He spoke as around 50 world leaders gather to discuss European defence, the Russia‑Ukraine war and rising tensions with China and Iran. Merz also acknowledged a “deep divide” between Europe and the United States while confirming confidential talks with France on a potential joint European nuclear deterrent. The remarks come amid controversy over US President Donald Trump’s comments about Greenland and questions over Washington’s Nato commitments.
Key Takeaways
- Friedrich Merz told the Munich Security Conference that “this order … no longer exists,” signaling a blunt reassessment of the post‑1945 rules‑based system.
- About 50 heads of state and government are attending the annual Munich Security Conference to focus on defence, transatlantic ties and the war in Ukraine.
- Merz said a “deep divide” has opened between Europe and the United States, citing cultural and policy differences that have widened in the past year.
- He confirmed “confidential talks” with French President Emmanuel Macron on a joint European nuclear deterrent; France and the UK remain Europe’s only nuclear powers.
- US actions cited at the conference include President Trump’s public comments on acquiring Greenland and tariffs on European imports, which many European leaders view as eroding trust.
- Macron urged Europe to “learn to become a geopolitical power,” calling for faster rearmament following Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
- US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the moment a “new era in geopolitics,” underscoring Washington’s own shift in rhetoric on global competition.
Background
The Munich Security Conference is an annual diplomatic forum where heads of state, defence ministers and security experts meet to debate global threats and cooperative responses. This edition convenes against a backdrop of intensified great‑power rivalry, a prolonged war in Ukraine since Russia’s full‑scale invasion in 2022, and sharper competition between the West and China. Longstanding elements of the post‑Cold War order — free trade, collective security arrangements, and shared democratic norms — have come under strain as unilateral economic and territorial tactics reappear.
Transatlantic relations have been tested by a series of US policy moves that European leaders see as unpredictable. Recent episodes cited at the conference include tariff threats and a highly publicised US interest in Greenland; such actions have fed a perception in some European capitals that US commitments to Nato and multilateralism are less stable. European defence spending and capabilities have been rising since 2022, but many leaders argue coordination and political will must accelerate to reduce strategic gaps.
Main Event
Merz opened the conference by telling peers that freedom is not guaranteed in an era of intensified big‑power politics and that Europeans must be ready to make sacrifice. He framed his address around a diagnosis that the rules‑based order, even at its imperfect best, no longer exists “in that form,” urging a sober reassessment rather than nostalgia. He explicitly referenced a widening rift with the United States and contrasted European approaches to speech, trade and constitutional limits with the populist currents he associated with the MAGA movement.
On nuclear issues, Merz said he and President Macron were holding “confidential talks” about building a joint European deterrent, without providing technical details or timelines. The proposal, if pursued, would touch on deep questions about sovereignty, NATO burden‑sharing, and the role of the US nuclear umbrella that many European states have relied upon for decades. France and the UK currently possess nuclear arsenals; Germany and most other European NATO members do not.
French President Emmanuel Macron used his remarks later on Friday to press for Europe to become a “geopolitical power,” calling for faster rearmament and collective action to confront threats. He described the war in Ukraine as an “existential challenge” for Europe and urged refusal to yield to Russian demands while increasing pressure on Moscow to secure a just peace. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said she planned to meet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss the Greenland episode and allied cohesion.
Analysis & Implications
Merz’s statement that the rules‑based order “no longer exists” is as much a political diagnosis as it is a policy argument: it signals frustration with unilateralism and an appeal for greater European agency. If European leaders accept that premise, policy implications range from accelerated defence integration to discussions about independent deterrence and new industrial strategies for critical technologies. Those choices would require difficult budgetary and political trade‑offs across EU and NATO members.
A public rupture with the United States would be costly for Europe because US military capacity, intelligence sharing and nuclear deterrence remain central to European security architectures. Merz’s call to “repair and revive transatlantic trust” reflects an unwillingness to abandon the alliance even while acknowledging deep disagreements. Restoring trust would likely demand clearer US commitments to NATO, predictable trade policy and sustained diplomatic engagement from Washington.
Talks of a European nuclear deterrent — even at an exploratory level — would reconfigure strategic thinking in Europe and beyond. Creating a credible, independent deterrent involves legal, technical, and political hurdles: procurement, command and control arrangements, and Nato interoperability, all while navigating treaty obligations and domestic political constraints. Any move in that direction would provoke sustained debate in capitals from Berlin to London and could complicate relations with the United States and Russia.
Comparison & Data
| Category | Europe (Example) | US/Nato |
|---|---|---|
| Nuclear-armed states (Europe) | France, UK (2 states) | US (single global) |
| War since | Ukraine — 2022 (full‑scale invasion) | N/A |
| Leaders at MSC | ~50 heads of state/government | Senior US officials attending |
The table highlights why European leaders stress both capability gaps and the unique role the US plays: only two European states retain nuclear arsenals, while the US provides global reach and extended deterrence. Since 2022, higher defence spending across Europe has aimed to reduce shortfalls, but experts note procurement cycles and political consensus take years to translate into capability. The Munich gathering crystallises these contrasts and the strategic choices now on the table.
Reactions & Quotes
Merz’s address drew immediate responses from political leaders and commentators, reflecting both alarm and calls for pragmatic cooperation. Below are representative official and expert lines delivered at the conference.
“Our freedom is not guaranteed.”
Friedrich Merz, German Chancellor (speech)
Merz used this line to press the point that European security can no longer be assumed and that democratic norms require active defence and political will. He followed by urging Europeans to accept difficult decisions on defence and alliance cohesion.
“We have to accelerate”
Emmanuel Macron, President of France (address)
Macron framed that acceleration in terms of rearmament and coordinated European planning, tying it directly to the perceived existential threat from Russia and the need for a stronger continental posture.
“Greenland’s gonna want us… We’re negotiating right now for Greenland.”
Donald Trump, US President (remarks)
Trump’s public remarks about Greenland were widely cited at the conference as symptomatic of unpredictable allied behaviour, reinforcing European concerns about Washington’s approach to bilateral and multilateral ties.
Unconfirmed
- Details and scope of the “confidential talks” between Germany and France on a European nuclear deterrent have not been disclosed and remain unconfirmed.
- Reports that the US has formal plans to annex Greenland beyond public statements remain unverified and have not been substantiated by official policy documents.
- Claims that Nato commitments have been formally downgraded are not corroborated by treaty changes; perceived erosion of assurance is based on rhetoric and policy signals rather than an altered legal framework.
Bottom Line
Merz’s blunt assessment that the rules‑based order “no longer exists” is intended less as a fatalistic verdict than as a call to action: European leaders must confront strategic reality and choose how much autonomy and collective investment they will accept. The Munich conference has amplified debates over whether Europe should accelerate defence integration, accept a more prominent role for its nuclear states, or seek firmer guarantees from Washington.
The immediate path forward will depend on political will in EU capitals and a reciprocal offer of predictability from the United States. If transatlantic trust can be repaired, cooperation on Ukraine, China and arms control is feasible; if not, Europe may pursue deeper strategic autonomy with consequential shifts in NATO and global security dynamics. Close attention to follow‑up statements and formal policies in the coming months will show whether Merz’s diagnosis produces policy change or merely reframes existing anxieties.