In recent years a surge in Colombian coca cultivation and global cocaine supply has coincided with rising overdose deaths in the United States and heightened violence in transit and producer countries. Since about 2015, policy changes in Colombia and shifts in trafficking control have helped drive production upward, while U.S. law enforcement reports larger seizures and researchers link the supply shock to a measurable increase in cocaine-involved fatalities. Economists estimate that the post-2015 expansion in supply accounts for roughly 1,500 additional U.S. overdose deaths per year, even as synthetic opioids like fentanyl remain the larger driver of total overdose mortality. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are debating whether renewed source-country interventions or alternative approaches can reduce harm.
Key takeaways
- Colombian coca area fell from about 168,000 hectares in 2000 to roughly 48,000 hectares by 2013, but then expanded sharply after 2015 due to several policy and security shifts.
- By 2022, Colombia’s coca cultivation area and potential cocaine output were more than three times their 2015 levels, according to the economists cited in the working paper.
- U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration data show the average size of cocaine seizures rose markedly after 2015, indicating larger shipments and greater supply flows.
- Economists Du, Hansen, Zhang, and Zou estimate the post-2015 cocaine surge is associated with about 1,500 additional U.S. overdose deaths per year.
- In 2023 there were roughly 30,000 overdose deaths involving cocaine in the U.S., about 28% of all overdose fatalities; synthetic opioids (mainly fentanyl) were involved in about 73,000 deaths, roughly 69%.
- Research finds substantial local violence linked to the supply shock: homicide rates in some Colombian areas rose by about one-third, with even larger increases in key transit hubs; Ecuador saw homicide increases of nearly five-fold in affected areas.
- Supply-side measures—crop eradication, interdiction and pressure on traffickers—have historically reduced availability, but policy shifts and enforcement gaps can produce rapid rebounds in cultivation and trafficking.
Background
For much of the 2000s and early 2010s, aggressive counter-narcotics efforts in Colombia, supported in part by the United States, contributed to a long decline in coca cultivation. Large-scale aerial fumigation and targeted operations reduced planting in many regions, and Colombia’s coca area dropped from roughly 168,000 hectares in 2000 to about 48,000 hectares by 2013. That period corresponded with tighter supply and reduced availability in some U.S. markets.
Beginning around 2015 several changes altered that trajectory. The Colombian government suspended a U.S.-backed aerial glyphosate fumigation program on public health grounds, and a 2016 peace accord with the FARC guerrillas reshaped control of rural territories. The demobilization of FARC created a security vacuum in remote coca-growing zones; competing armed groups, dissident factions and criminal organizations moved in to seize land and expand production. At the same time, some crop-substitution programs produced perverse incentives, as farmers seeking compensation or aid sometimes replanted coca to qualify.
Main event
After 2015, Colombia experienced a rapid resurgence of coca cultivation driven by a mix of policy reversals, shifting local control and market incentives. New traffickers consolidated territory by encouraging or coercing farmers to plant coca, while interruptions to eradication and substitution programs lowered the costs and risks of cultivation. The result was a large increase in potential cocaine output from traditional producing areas.
As production rose, traffickers escalated shipments to major consumer markets. U.S. law enforcement began reporting not just more arrests but larger average seizure sizes, a pattern consistent with higher volumes in transit. Publicized busts—such as a recent traffic stop in Upland, California where officers discovered about 66 pounds of cocaine—illustrate the local manifestations of the broader supply expansion.
The economics of the market further amplified the effect: greater supply pushed wholesale and street prices down in many local markets, lowering the barrier for experimentation and repeat use. Economists describe cocaine as an “experience good,” meaning first use can generate repeat demand; cheaper, easier-to-obtain product therefore can expand the user base and raise population-level consumption.
Analysis & implications
The immediate public-health implication is clear: expanded supply has contributed to more cocaine-related harms, including fatal overdoses. The working paper by Du, Hansen, Zhang and Zou estimates roughly 1,500 extra U.S. overdose deaths annually are attributable to the post-2015 supply surge. That figure is substantial in absolute terms and meaningful relative to other drivers of overdose mortality.
However, cocaine’s contribution to total overdose deaths is smaller than fentanyl’s. In 2023, cocaine was involved in about 30,000 deaths (28% of overdose fatalities) while synthetic opioids—mainly fentanyl—were involved in roughly 73,000 deaths (69%). The overlap is important: some fatalities involve both substances, and fentanyl contamination of stimulants has increased the lethality of cocaine in some jurisdictions.
On the policy side, the evidence suggests that supply-side pressure in source countries can reduce availability and associated harms, at least temporarily. But interventions carry trade-offs: aerial fumigation raised health concerns, forced eradication can harm livelihoods, and demobilization or peace processes can produce governance vacuums exploited by criminal groups. Effective response likely requires coordinated interdiction, targeted development programs that avoid perverse incentives, and domestic public-health measures to reduce overdose risk.
Comparison & data
| Indicator | Year / Value |
|---|---|
| Colombian coca cultivation | 2000: ~168,000 ha; 2013: ~48,000 ha; 2022: >3× 2015 levels |
| U.S. cocaine-involved deaths | 2023: ~30,000 (≈28% of overdose deaths) |
| U.S. synthetic opioid deaths | 2023: ~73,000 (≈69% of overdose deaths) |
The table above synthesizes public figures and authors’ estimates reported in the underlying research and official statistics. It shows a sharp decline in coca area in the early 2000s followed by a rapid rebound in the 2015–2022 period, and places cocaine’s mortality burden in context with the dominant role of synthetic opioids in U.S. overdose mortality.
Reactions & quotes
“Because cocaine is an experience good, a big supply shock leads to more people trying it and potentially continuing use,” one co-author noted, explaining the demand-side channel linking supply to higher use.
Ben Hansen, economist (working paper co-author)
Colombian and U.S. officials have flagged the surge as a bilateral challenge, calling for stepped-up cooperation to disrupt trafficking while balancing public-health concerns.
Official statements, Colombian and U.S. governments
Researchers documenting regional effects found substantial rises in violence and homicide in producer and transit areas tied to the supply expansion.
Gianmarco Daniele, Adam Soliman, Juan Vargas (working paper)
Unconfirmed
- Quantitative attribution of exact overdose deaths to supply changes at fine geographic scales remains subject to modeling assumptions and may vary across states and years.
- Precise hectares of coca in Colombia for every year between 2015 and 2022 are reported with uncertainty and different sources use varying estimation methods.
- Reported increases in seizures reflect both higher flows and possibly intensified interdiction; distinguishing those effects requires detailed operational data.
Bottom line
The post-2015 resurgence of coca cultivation in Colombia and the associated boom in cocaine supply have had measurable public-health and security consequences: more available cocaine, lower prices, increased use and a significant rise in cocaine-involved overdose deaths in the United States, alongside violence and instability in producer and transit countries. Economists’ estimates point to roughly 1,500 extra U.S. overdose deaths per year tied to the supply surge, underscoring a clear causal pathway from source-country dynamics to consumer-country harm.
Policy responses will need to be multifaceted. Supply-side measures can reduce availability but can also generate unintended consequences if not paired with robust public-health interventions, credible alternative livelihoods for farmers, and international cooperation to disrupt trafficking networks. Given the dominant role of fentanyl in overall overdose mortality, interventions that address polysubstance contamination, improve testing and treatment access, and reduce demand remain essential.
Sources
- NPR — Planet Money (media report summarizing research)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime — World Drug Report (international agency, data and analysis)
- U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention — overdose data (official public-health statistics)
- U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration — seizure reporting (official law enforcement data)
- Du, Hansen, Zhang & Zou working paper (academic/working paper)
- Daniele, Soliman & Vargas working paper on spillovers (academic/working paper)