In early January 2026, amid nationwide unrest and mounting threats of U.S. strikes, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delegated day‑to‑day crisis management to Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Larijani, 67, a former Revolutionary Guards commander, has since widened his remit: suppressing protests, coordinating with regional interlocutors, overseeing nuclear diplomacy and drafting contingency plans to keep the Islamic Republic functioning under attack. His elevation has effectively sidelined President Masoud Pezeshkian, who has publicly emphasized his nonpolitical background and limited capacity to resolve the country’s crises. Officials interviewed for this report say Larijani’s team is focused on survivability—hardening command networks, securing supply chains and preparing retaliatory options should a war be forced on Tehran.
Key Takeaways
- Ali Larijani, 67, now leads Iran’s national security response following directives from Ayatollah Khamenei; his portfolio includes internal security, foreign liaising and nuclear talks.
- Sources for this article include six senior Iranian officials (one tied to Khamenei’s office), three Revolutionary Guards members and two former diplomats; several spoke on condition of anonymity.
- Larijani supervised a forceful crackdown on recent nationwide protests; state security measures intensified in the weeks after his appointment.
- Tehran has increased diplomatic outreach to Russia, Qatar and Oman while negotiating with Washington on nuclear issues and contingency management.
- Larijani told Al Jazeera in February that Iran had spent seven to eight months identifying and fixing weaknesses and would not start a war but would respond if attacked.
- President Masoud Pezeshkian has been marginalized politically; he has repeatedly stated, “I’m a doctor, not a politician,” underscoring his constrained role.
- U.S. force posture in the region and Washington’s threats have accelerated Iran’s planning for continuity of government and asymmetric retaliation.
Background
Iran entered 2026 under acute pressure: a wave of domestic protests challenged the clerical establishment, while the United States signaled punitive options, including strikes. In early January, Ayatollah Khamenei moved to consolidate decision‑making by elevating Ali Larijani, a long‑time figure in Iran’s security architecture, to a central coordinating role. Larijani’s past combines political experience and service in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a profile that has reassured hardliners worried about regime survival.
President Masoud Pezeshkian, elected amid hopes for economic and social reform, has seen his authority erode as security priorities have overridden civilian governance. The split between a security‑first response and demands for political opening has framed intra‑elite debates, with factions disagreeing over how to balance repression, negotiation and international signaling. External actors—including Russia and Gulf intermediaries—have taken on greater importance as Tehran seeks partners for deterrence and de‑escalation.
Main Event
Since his elevation, Larijani has overseen a combination of domestic and external measures intended to preserve the Islamic Republic through pressure or conflict. Domestically, security services moved to quash the protests with lethal force in several cities and to roll out emergency controls on information and movement. Officials described layered contingency planning: dispersion of senior decision‑makers, redundancies for command and control, and prioritization of key infrastructure for continued governance.
On the diplomatic front, Larijani has held interlocutions with regional partners and powers perceived as sympathetic or useful for mediation. Delegations and back‑channel contact with Qatar and Oman have been used to relay messages to Washington and to reduce immediate escalation risk. At the same time, Tehran has engaged with Moscow to clarify mutual expectations, particularly on regional deterrence and arms logistics.
Larijani has also taken charge of nuclear negotiations, according to officials, linking diplomacy to survival planning rather than treating it as a standalone issue. The leadership has framed talks as part of a broader strategy to delay or avert conflict, while refining military and irregular options for retaliation. Leaders publicly and privately stress that Iran does not seek war but has prepared responses if strikes occur.
Analysis & Implications
Larijani’s ascent marks a shift toward securitized governance where crisis management is centralized under a trusted national security figure. That shift narrows room for civilian policy initiatives and increases the influence of security services over economic and social priorities. For Iranians, this may mean prolonged restrictions and diminished prospects for reform in the near term.
Regionally, Iran’s strengthened ties with intermediaries and with Russia aim to complicate any external attempt at decisive military action. Such partnerships can raise the costs for an adversary contemplating strikes, but they also risk expanding the geographic scope of confrontation and entangling third parties in any escalation. Diplomacy remains a dual track: stabilizing rhetoric publicly, contingency war‑planning privately.
Economically, an extended securitization of governance and the threat of conflict could deter foreign investment, exacerbate inflationary pressures and deepen supply disruptions—further constraining Tehran’s policy options. For Washington and its partners, Larijani’s consolidation reduces the leverage of reformist interlocutors and may make de‑escalation more contingent on cross‑channel confidence‑building measures.
Comparison & Data
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| May 2024 | Public imagery of Ali Larijani circulates in Iranian press |
| Early January 2026 | Ayatollah Khamenei assigns Larijani expanded crisis authority |
| Feb 22, 2026 | Article summarizing Larijani’s role published |
The timeline above underscores how rapidly Larijani’s operational role has grown in the space of weeks to months. While the dates are limited, they indicate a compressed decision cycle in Tehran, where security assessments now dominate policy sequencing.
Reactions & Quotes
“We are ready in our country. We are definitely more powerful than before. We have prepared in the past seven, eight months. We found our weaknesses and fixed them,”
Ali Larijani, interview with Al Jazeera
Larijani’s public remarks to Al Jazeera encapsulate Tehran’s message: deterrence through preparation. Officials say the statement also serves a domestic audience, signaling competence and control to both security elites and a population shaken by protests.
“I’m a doctor, not a politician,”
President Masoud Pezeshkian (public remarks)
Pezeshkian’s repeated self‑description highlights his marginalization from security decision‑making. Observers interpret this as an attempt to lower expectations for swift reform while maintaining a public face of civilian governance.
Unconfirmed
- Precise lists of high‑value targets prepared for retaliation have not been publicly confirmed and remain described only in general terms by anonymous sources.
- Details about the physical dispersal plans for Iran’s leadership and the locations of hardened command sites are reported in internal briefings but lack independent verification.
- The exact nature and timeline of any covert arrangements with foreign partners—especially specific military or logistical guarantees from Russia—are not fully corroborated.
Bottom Line
Ali Larijani’s expanded role reflects a regime prioritizing survival in the face of simultaneous domestic unrest and external pressure. Centralizing security decision‑making under a veteran operative reduces immediate fragmentation but narrows political space for civilian governance and reform. For outside actors, the central question is whether deterrence and diplomacy can outpace the momentum toward security‑first policy and avert a damaging escalation.
Watch for three near‑term indicators: changes in U.S. force posture in the region, the pace and content of back‑channel diplomacy through Gulf intermediaries, and whether Tehran’s security measures translate into longer‑term repression or a return to managed political openings. Each will shape whether Larijani’s preparations remain defensive signaling or tip into broader confrontation.