Ukraine Is Losing the War

Four years after Russia launched a full-scale invasion, the Biden and Trump administrations’ proposals and Kyiv’s firm refusal have collided with hard battlefield realities. In a draft plan reported by Axios in November, U.S. negotiators reportedly proposed recognizing Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk as de facto Russian-held territory while leaving Russia in control of parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia; President Volodymyr Zelensky has rejected any settlement that violates Ukraine’s 1991 borders. Yet the balance on the ground favors Moscow: Russia holds nearly a fifth of Ukraine’s territory, boasts larger stocks of men and heavy equipment, and continues to sustain operations that erode Kyiv’s ability to retake large swaths. Those material constraints are pushing Kyiv toward a bitter choice between protracted, costly fighting and a compromise peace that would cede territory.

Key Takeaways

• Territorial control: Russia now holds almost 20 percent of Ukraine’s land within its 1991 borders and controls 99% of Luhansk, 76% of Kherson, 74% of Zaporizhzhia, and 72% of Donetsk.
• Casualties: Mediazona’s tally identified 156,151 Russian fatalities and estimates total Russian deaths at about 219,000 by end-2025; UA Losses reports 87,045 Ukrainian KIA and 85,906 MIA.
• Manpower disparity: Ukraine’s population is ~36 million with ~9.5 million men aged 25–54; that cohort has lost an estimated 1–2 percent. Russia’s 140 million population includes ~30.2 million men in the same group, with losses around 0.5–0.7 percent.
• Force density: Ukraine fields roughly 300,000 frontline troops—about 483 soldiers per mile along a 620-mile frontline—well below Cold War-era defense benchmarks of ~1,500 per mile.
• Equipment gap: As of 2025 Russia outnumbered Ukraine across major systems—nearly five times more tanks, about 163 combat aircraft to Ukraine’s 66, and large advantages in mobile artillery, MLRS, and mortars.
• Economic capacity: 2024 PPP GDPs put Russia near $7 trillion and Ukraine near $657 billion; at roughly 7% of GDP, Russia can allocate substantially more to defense than Ukraine even allowing for foreign aid.
• Pace of advance: From October 2024 to October 2025 Russia gained roughly 1,703 square miles; at that rate, capturing all remaining territory east of the Dnieper would take decades.

Background

The conflict’s political roots stretch back to 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and supported separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. Minsk agreements temporarily paused large-scale fighting but left unresolved political questions and territorial disputes. In February 2022 Moscow escalated to a full-scale invasion and later in 2022 annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. Those moves altered the map and hardened Ukrainian determination to restore the country’s 1991 borders.

Western military assistance since 2022 has provided Kyiv with antitank weapons, air defenses, artillery systems, long-range fires, and drones; but much of that materiel came from partner stockpiles and older systems. Russia has relied on large stockpiles, a sizeable defense industry, and—according to reporting—new streams of partner support. The two sides therefore bring asymmetric mixes of home-produced and transferred systems to the fight, with Russia maintaining a quantitative edge in heavy systems and overall logistics depth.

Main Event

In November, Axios reported a U.S. draft plan that would lock in Russian control over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk and portions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Kyiv publicly rejects such concessions, and President Zelensky insists on restoring all territory within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. Behind the diplomatic standoff, however, the military situation is constraining Kyiv’s options: Russian advances since 2022 have been slow but steady, and Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed to dislodge entrenched positions protected by the so-called Surovikin Line and massive indirect fire.

The battlefield has evolved as both sides adopt drones and new tactics. Russia’s tactics—shifting to fiber-optic guidance for drones, prioritizing strikes on logistics and drone operators, and using small, infiltrating assault groups—have eroded Ukrainian freedom of maneuver. The 2024 Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk region reportedly prompted these Russian adaptations, which increased the effectiveness of Russian artillery and interdiction campaigns behind the frontline.

Domestic dynamics also matter. Kyiv faces recruitment shortfalls, desertions, and unpopular conscription measures—sometimes called “busification”—that pull older or less fit men into service and reduce overall combat effectiveness. Moscow, by contrast, fields large numbers of contract soldiers and has so far met personnel needs at scale, allowing it to sustain operations and concentrate forces where it chooses.

Analysis & Implications

Material asymmetries—population, GDP, equipment stocks, and reserve depth—translate into strategic advantages for Russia. A state with a larger pool of manpower and older, voluminous weapon stocks can absorb high attrition and keep pressure on multiple fronts. Even if Russian advances are incremental, they compound over time; a slow, steady loss of territory and attrition of Ukrainian manpower favor Moscow’s strategic patience over Kyiv’s need for decisive gains.

For Kyiv and its Western partners the key question is cost-benefit: how much territory and human capital is Kyiv willing to risk to pursue a restoration of 1991 borders, and how much support will Western governments sustain for that aim? Political constraints in donor countries—fiscal limits, aid fatigue, and electoral cycles—make long-term, open-ended transfers of men and materiel uncertain. That reality increases the likelihood that political negotiations will factor battlefield facts into any settlement talks.

Accepting a “bad peace” that cedes some eastern regions would be politically painful but could preserve an independent Ukrainian core able to pursue reforms, reorient economically westward, and rebuild defensive depth optimized for drone-era warfare. Conversely, continued attrition risks further territorial loss and human cost without clear prospect of a decisive turnaround. Western policy must therefore weigh deterrence and sustainment against the domestic costs of prolonged support.

Comparison & Data

The table shows magnitudes rather than qualitative capability; much Russian equipment is older but abundant, while Western transfers to Ukraine are often secondhand, limiting their transformational effect at scale. The arithmetic favors a defensive, resource-conserving Kyiv unless partners commit sustained, large-scale replenishment.

Reactions & Quotes

European leaders have publicly warned against territorial concessions, arguing that changing borders by force would set a dangerous precedent. Those statements frame the diplomatic stakes Kyiv faces when weighing any negotiated settlement.

“Trading territory for peace is a trap.”

Kaja Kallas, EU official

Kallas’s remark has been echoed in substance by other EU capitals, which emphasize that recognizing land grabs risks emboldening revisionist actors elsewhere. German and French leaders have similarly insisted that borders cannot be rewritten by military force.

“International borders must not be changed by force.”

German and French leaders / EU Commission

Within Kyiv’s security circle, senior officials acknowledge that tactical actions such as deep strikes impose costs on Russia but stop short of promising a near-term end to the war. That realism shapes a growing internal debate over whether to continue high-risk offensive operations or negotiate from a position constrained by the battlefield.

Unconfirmed

• The exact total of battlefield deaths remains contested; official tallies diverge and independent tallies (Mediazona, UA Losses) use different methodologies and face reporting gaps.
• The long-term content and acceptance of the November U.S. draft peace plan reported by Axios remain politically sensitive; full details and official U.S. endorsement are not publicly confirmed.
• The depth and durability of third-party military replenishment (e.g., future Western commitments, potential Chinese materiel transfers) are uncertain and could materially change the balance.
• The scale and permanence of any future Russian political objectives beyond securing Donetsk and Luhansk—should Moscow declare those aims satisfied—remain speculative.

Bottom Line

Material realities on the ground—manpower, equipment, economics, and force posture—currently favor Russia’s ability to sustain a long war of attrition. That advantage does not guarantee rapid conquest, but it does make Ukrainian recovery of all lost territory increasingly costly and unlikely without a major, sustained external surge in personnel and materiel.

For Kyiv and its partners the central choice is stark: continue a costly and uncertain campaign to restore 1991 borders, or negotiate a compromise that cedes territory but preserves an independent Ukrainian state capable of westward reform and defense improvement. Either path requires clear political will, realistic appraisal of costs, and decisive policy choices from Kyiv’s backers.

Sources

• Foreign Affairs — Feature analysis (original article)
• Axios — Reporting on U.S. draft peace plan (news outlet)
• Mediazona — Russian media research on battlefield casualties (media/monitoring)
• UA Losses — Ukrainian NGO casualty tracking (non-governmental)