Lead: U.S. authorities on Nov. 27, 2025 identified a suspect in the National Guard shooting who reportedly had ties to so‑called Afghan “Zero Units,” an elite set of Afghan partner forces active during the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. An ID badge shared online links the suspect to the Kandahar Strike Force (often referenced as “03”) and to a location called Firebase Gecko in Kandahar; CBS News has not independently authenticated those images. U.S. officials, including a senior U.S. official cited by media, have said the suspect previously worked with U.S. government partners in Kandahar, a connection that raises questions about vetting, asylum pathways and potential security risks. The reporting situates the individual in a broader, contested legacy of secrecy, intensive U.S. partnership and allegations of abuses attached to these units.
Key Takeaways
- An ID badge circulated online purportedly lists the suspect as assigned to “Kandahar Strike Force” (unit “03”) and names “Firebase Gecko”; CBS News has not independently verified the badge.
- CBS reporting cites a U.S. official saying the suspect previously worked “with the U.S. Government, including CIA, as a member of a partner force in Kandahar.”
- Zero Units were Afghan‑national formations operating under the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and trained and equipped in cooperation with U.S. intelligence and special operations.
- These units were regarded by U.S. and coalition partners as among the most operationally capable domestic forces but were also accused of extrajudicial killings and harsh night raids.
- After the Taliban retook Afghanistan in August 2021, members of Zero Units were prioritized for evacuation due to high risk of Taliban reprisals; many gained asylum or relocation through U.S. evacuations.
- The association of the suspect with an NDS partner unit has prompted renewed scrutiny of vetting and post‑resettlement monitoring programs for former Afghan partners.
Background
The term “Zero Units” refers to a collection of highly trained Afghan partner forces created during the U.S. and coalition presence in Afghanistan. These units were organized within or alongside the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the intelligence service that received substantial U.S. assistance in structure, training and equipment in the 2000s and 2010s. U.S. special operations and CIA‑linked programs cultivated select Afghan formations for counterterrorism, targeted operations and intelligence collection in southern provinces such as Kandahar.
Operational secrecy was a defining feature: many missions were classified, command relationships were often opaque, and units worked with U.S. intelligence and special forces at forward sites — Firebase Gecko is one such facility repeatedly cited in reporting as a hub in Kandahar. At the same time, human rights organizations and Afghan civilians have long accused parts of these forces of carrying out extrajudicial killings, abusive night raids and other serious violations during counterinsurgency campaigns. That dual legacy — operational effectiveness coupled with abuse allegations — shaped how both Afghan communities and international partners viewed these formations.
Main Event
On Nov. 27, 2025, U.S. news outlets reported that the suspect in the National Guard shooting had an online ID badge tying him to the Kandahar Strike Force, often named as “03.” The badge also reportedly contained the phrase “Firebase Gecko,” a compound associated in past reporting with CIA and special operations activity in Kandahar, including sites within areas historically linked to the late Taliban founder Mullah Omar’s compound. CBS News noted it had not independently authenticated the badge and presented a U.S. official’s statement that the individual had worked with U.S. government partner forces.
A former senior Afghan general who served under the pre‑2021 government told reporters that the Kandahar Strike Force was managed under an NDS special forces directorate, trained and equipped with CIA support, and tasked with high‑risk counterterrorism missions. In U.S. domestic reporting, officials emphasized that affiliation with such partner forces typically placed individuals high on Taliban target lists after the group’s August 2021 takeover — explaining why many members were evacuated or resettled abroad.
At the time of reporting there was no immediate response from the Taliban‑led authorities in Kabul and no official confirmation yet from U.S. intelligence publicly released about the suspect’s full history. Law enforcement and federal agencies in the U.S. have opened inquiries into the shooting and the subject’s background, including how prior partner‑force status intersected with immigration or resettlement records. Investigations are ongoing and officials have said they will review archival records and partner‑force rosters as part of their fact‑finding.
Analysis & Implications
The case highlights a long‑standing tension: the U.S. cultivated tightly controlled Afghan partner units for counterterrorism effectiveness, then in 2021 prioritized many of their members for evacuation because those same affiliations made them targets of Taliban retribution. That evacuation policy created pathways to asylum for many who had fought alongside U.S. forces, but it also introduced long‑term challenges for resettlement screening and post‑arrival monitoring of individuals with combat and intelligence backgrounds.
From a security and policy perspective, the reported connection to a Zero Unit will likely prompt renewed reviews of vetting procedures used during the 2021 evacuations and subsequent humanitarian admissions. Agencies will be scrutinized on whether available intelligence about past conduct and potential radicalization was adequately shared across immigration, homeland security and local law enforcement. The balance between offering protection to at‑risk partners and managing public safety concerns is a difficult policy trade‑off that this case brings into sharp relief.
Diplomatically, the affair could complicate U.S. messaging to partners and host communities about responsibility for alleged abuses by partner forces. Allies and rights groups have long pushed for accountability for extrajudicial actions attributed to some NDS‑linked units; renewed attention may revive calls for transparent reviews, declassification of operational records and mechanisms for redress for victims. Domestically, the incident may fuel political debate about refugee vetting, intelligence oversight and the resources allocated to long‑term integration and monitoring programs.
Comparison & Data
| Unit | Command/Patron | Reputation |
|---|---|---|
| Kandahar Strike Force (“03”) | NDS special forces; partnered with CIA/special ops | Highly operational, trained; accused in some reports of harsh night raids |
| Other Zero Units | NDS units with variable U.S. oversight | Operationally capable; varying allegations of abuse across regions |
The table summarizes how reporting has described the Kandahar Strike Force relative to other so‑called Zero Units. Journalistic and NGO investigations over years have repeatedly emphasized operational skill paired with secrecy and contested conduct; those themes underpin how investigators and policymakers now approach historical records as they review individual cases.
Reactions & Quotes
“The suspect had previously worked with the U.S. government, including CIA, as a member of a partner force in Kandahar,”
U.S. official, as reported by media
That statement—attributed to a U.S. official in public reporting—was cited to explain governmental awareness of the suspect’s partner‑force background and the potential intelligence linkages investigators will examine.
“03 unit, also known as the Kandahar Strike Force, was under [the NDS] special forces directorate…trained and equipped by the CIA,”
Former senior Afghan general (CBS interview)
The former general’s brief characterization places the unit within the NDS command structure and underscores the unit’s operational profile and external training relationships.
Unconfirmed
- The authenticity of the ID badge circulating online has not been independently verified; investigators are treating the image as a lead pending forensic confirmation.
- Specific operational orders or individual actions tying the suspect to particular alleged abuses by Zero Units have not been publicly documented or confirmed.
- No public statement from the current Afghan authorities in Kabul confirming or denying the suspect’s service in NDS‑linked formations had been released at the time of reporting.
Bottom Line
The reported link between the National Guard shooting suspect and an Afghan Zero Unit places a spotlight on the complex legacy of U.S. partnerships in Afghanistan: elite partner forces provided tactical capabilities but also carried allegations of serious abuses. That duality complicates accountability, asylum decisions and domestic security policy in receiving countries.
For U.S. investigators and policymakers, the immediate priorities will be verifying the badge and service records, assessing any nexus to the shooting, and reviewing vetting and monitoring processes that governed post‑2021 evacuations. Longer term, the episode is likely to renew policy debates about how to preserve moral obligations to at‑risk partners while strengthening safeguards that protect communities and ensure accountability.
Sources
- CBS News — media reporting and interview with former Afghan official (Nov. 27, 2025)
- Human Rights Watch — NGO reporting on Afghan security forces and rights concerns (background resource)