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Leak reveals errors in COP30 informal list of fossil‑fuel roadmap opponents

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At the close of COP30 in Belém, a leaked, presidency-drawn “informal list” claiming 84 countries opposed adding a fossil‑fuel transition roadmap to the summit outcome has been shown to contain multiple contradictions and likely mistakes. Carbon Brief obtained the list and found 14 countries named on both supporter and opposer lists, the full membership of the least‑developed countries (LDCs) listed as opponents despite LDC leadership saying they did not block the idea, and at least one country on the list—Turkey—denying it opposed the roadmap. The row contributed to the Brazilian presidency concluding there was no path to consensus on including a roadmap in the formal COP30 decision.

Key takeaways

  • The leaked “informal list” compiled by the COP30 presidency identifies 84 countries labelled as opposing a fossil‑fuel transition roadmap; Carbon Brief’s review finds internal inconsistencies and probable errors.
  • Fourteen countries appear on both the proponents’ and opponents’ lists, reflecting membership overlaps across negotiating blocs rather than clear national positions.
  • All 42 LDCs present in Belém—except Afghanistan and Myanmar who were absent—appear on the opponents’ list, though LDC chair advisers say the group did not oppose the roadmap.
  • Two negotiating blocs—the 22‑member Arab group and the 25‑member LMDCs—make up roughly 39 of the opposers, though member positions within those blocs varied.
  • Supporters’ reporting points to an 85‑strong supporters list (including Australia); the presidency told negotiators there were “80 for and 80 against” during late negotiations, a figure participants later questioned.
  • Notable entries on the opposers’ list include Russia, several fossil‑fuel‑dependent economies, and three EU members (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary), some of which had prior public stances factored into the tally.
  • Brazil announced it will pursue roadmaps on fossil fuels and deforestation under its own presidency initiative after concluding consensus in the COP plenary was impossible.

Background

COP28 (Dubai, 2023) finalised the first global stocktake and called for collective action, including efforts to transition away from fossil fuels. Negotiations since then—through COP29 in Baku and into COP30—have struggled to convert that collective aspiration into agreed processes or language under the UN climate regime. Ahead of COP30, Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva unexpectedly called for “roadmaps” on transitioning from fossil fuels and on halting and reversing deforestation, elevating the idea into central discussions in Belém even though it was not on the formal agenda.

Because COP decisions rely on consensus, the presidency pursued informal consultations to gauge whether a roadmap could be adopted in the final “mutirão” package. In late, closed-door sessions during the summit’s final hours, the Brazilian presidency told delegates there was no prospect of agreement because positions were sharply divided—summarised to negotiators as “80 for and 80 against.” That claim—repeated in private meetings—became a focal point for media and delegate scrutiny after the summit.

Main event

During the closing phase of COP30, Carbon Brief obtained two separate lists: a supporters’ list that was circulated earlier and an 84‑country “informal” list compiled by the presidency indicating opposers. The supporters’ list—later reported at 85 countries—largely comprised negotiating alliances such as AOSIS, the Environmental Integrity Group, AILAC and the EU. Opposers’ names were filled out after a meeting of roughly 50 delegations and supplemented by membership rolls of negotiating blocs, producing the 84‑name tally.

Carbon Brief’s scrutiny of the opposers’ list uncovered at least three categories of problems. First, 14 countries are named on both lists—an outcome of overlapping bloc memberships but one that makes the lists unreliable as a straightforward tally of national positions. Second, the opposers’ list appears to contain the full set of 42 LDCs that were present in Belém (excluding Afghanistan and Myanmar), even though the LDC chair’s office says the group did not oppose the roadmap and publicly signalled support for urgent action to keep 1.5C within reach. Third, individual entries such as Turkey’s were contested: Turkey, agreed to host COP31, told Carbon Brief that its listing as an opposer was “wrong.”

Two negotiating blocs formed the bulk of the opposers: the 22‑member Arab group, chaired in Belém by Saudi Arabia, and the LMDCs, with 25 members chaired by India. Reporting from the International Institute for Sustainable Development’s Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) corroborates that both blocs resisted proscriptive or prescriptive language on a fossil‑fuel roadmap during the talks, but delegates within and outside those blocs gave varied reasons for their stances, from concerns about national development pathways to demands for finance and just transition measures.

Analysis & implications

The leak and its flaws illustrate the limits of informal intelligence gathering during high‑stakes multilateral diplomacy. Compilers of the opposers’ list appear to have merged statements made in closed sessions, pre‑existing national positions, and negotiating‑bloc membership rolls—creating a snapshot that mixed real-time objections with longer‑standing alignments. That approach risks mischaracterising positions, feeding media narratives of clear “blockers,” and hardening diplomatic stances that might otherwise be negotiated.

Politically, the confusion reinforces long‑standing tensions between calls for firm, prescriptive global measures and developing countries’ insistence on nationally determined pathways and compensatory finance. Many developing delegations emphasised adaptation, just transition, and financial support as prerequisites for endorsing any prescriptive fossil‑fuel phaseout language. The presence of fossil‑fuel exporters and right‑leaning governments among the named opposers is consistent with those states’ prior reluctance to commit to rapid, externally mandated phaseouts.

For the COP process, the episode reduces trust in presidency‑driven informal tallies and underscores the procedural fragility of consensus decision‑making. If presidencies rely on informal, unverified lists to declare the impossibility of consensus, they may be precluding compromise pathways. Brazil’s decision to advance roadmaps under its own initiative may keep momentum alive, but it also shifts key choices outside the formal COP decision text, potentially weakening obligations and widening the gap between rhetoric and binding collective action.

Internationally, the misreporting or miscounting of positions can fuel misleading media narratives that a small set of countries “blocked” progress, obscuring the heterogeneous reasons behind opposition and the conditional nature of many countries’ concerns. That reductionist framing complicates public accountability and distracts attention from practical bargaining lines—finance, timelines, worker transitions, and differentiated responsibilities—that will determine whether a credible, equitable transition path can be devised.

Metric Count / detail
Opposers (informal leaked list) 84 countries
Supporters (list reported) 85 countries
Countries on both lists 14 countries
LDCs present in Belém 42 nations (all listed as opposers in leak)
Africa group membership 54 members; 37 named on opposers’ list

These numbers show how small discrepancies in counting and the inclusion of bloc memberships can materially change perceptions about consensus on contested texts. The table does not resolve which individual countries actually voiced opposition in plenary, but it highlights the gulf between an informal tally and a recorded negotiating record such as the ENB summaries.

Reactions & quotes

Key negotiators and observers reacted to the leak and its consequences in different ways, highlighting procedural and substantive concerns.

“It is not correct that the LDCs, as a bloc, opposed a fossil‑fuel roadmap during COP30 negotiations.”

Manjeet Dhakal, Lead adviser to the LDC chair (statement to Carbon Brief)

Dhakal emphasised that the LDC group had publicly framed a transition away from fossil fuels as an urgent action to keep 1.5C within reach, and that some LDC members—such as Nepal—supported the roadmap proposal.

“Its inclusion on that list is wrong.”

Turkish delegation spokesperson (comment to Carbon Brief)

Turkey, which will co‑preside over COP31, denied opposing the roadmap and called its appearance among opposers a mistake—an exchange that highlights how errors in an informal list can have diplomatic repercussions.

“We know some of you had greater ambitions… we need roadmaps so that humanity, in a just and planned manner, can overcome its dependence on fossil fuels.”

André Corrêa do Lago, COP30 president (closing plenary remarks)

Corrêa do Lago announced Brazil would develop two roadmaps—on deforestation and on transitioning away from fossil fuels—through high‑level dialogues and a Colombian conference in April, signalling a presidency workaround after failing to secure consensus in the COP text.

Unconfirmed

  • The presidency’s repeated claim of “80 for and 80 against” the roadmap has not been substantiated by a documented roll call of national positions and remains unverified.
  • It is unconfirmed whether the LDCs were deliberately included on the opposers’ list due to an administrative error or as a result of automatic bloc‑based filling; LDC leadership disputes the characterization.
  • The precise motives of every country listed as an opposer—whether ideological, economic, or tactical—are not fully documented in the leaked list and require country‑by‑country confirmation.
  • Reports that all 54 members of the Africa Group aligned with the Arab Group on opposing the roadmap are inconsistent with multiple African delegates’ public comments and remain partially unverified.

Bottom line

The leaked informal list from COP30 highlights how informal tallying and bloc‑based compilation can create misleading impressions of who blocked what at multilateral talks. The substantive disagreements around a fossil‑fuel roadmap are real, but the lists released or leaked during the summit mixed overlapping bloc memberships, pre‑existing national stances and contemporaneous objections—producing a snapshot that cannot be read as a definitive record of who blocked the COP30 outcome.

For future presidencies and observers, the episode is a prompt to prioritize transparent, contemporaneous recording of positions and to avoid reliance on unverified, bloc‑aggregated lists when declaring the prospects for consensus. Brazil’s choice to pursue roadmaps outside the formal COP text keeps the idea alive, but it also shifts critical decisions onto new processes whose inclusivity, level of ambition and linkage to finance and just transition measures will determine whether they deliver meaningful, equitable outcomes.

Sources

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