Lead
On 8 January 2026, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition said Aidarous al-Zubaidi, leader of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), slipped out of Yemen and reached the United Arab Emirates after transiting Somaliland. The coalition said he boarded a vessel from Aden to Berbera on Wednesday night, then flew to Abu Dhabi via Mogadishu. Officials alleged the aircraft turned off its identification systems over the Gulf of Oman before reactivating them near Al Reef military airport. The STC and UAE had not issued immediate public responses to the coalition’s statement.
Key Takeaways
- The coalition reported al-Zubaidi departed Aden by boat for Berbera, Somaliland on the night of 7–8 January 2026.
- The statement said al-Zubaidi then boarded a plane that stopped in Mogadishu and landed at Al Reef military airport in Abu Dhabi, after a temporary transponder shutdown over the Gulf of Oman.
- No immediate comment was available from the STC or the UAE at the time of the coalition’s announcement on 8 January 2026.
- The move, if confirmed, risks further straining Saudi–UAE ties exposed by the December 2025 clashes between the Riyadh-backed government and Abu Dhabi-backed STC forces.
- In late December 2025 the Saudi-led coalition struck Mukalla on 30 December, alleging a UAE-linked weapons shipment; the UAE denied the claim and said it would end its counterterrorism mission in Yemen.
- Yemeni government forces, supported by Saudi air power, subsequently retook Hadramout and Mahra; the STC said it would attend Saudi-hosted peace talks.
- Rashad al-Alimi said al-Zubaidi was removed from the Presidential Leadership Council and requested a legal investigation for “committing high treason.”
Background
The Southern Transitional Council emerged as a powerful secessionist movement in southern Yemen after the 2019–2020 political fracturing of the anti-Houthi coalition. Backed politically and materially at times by the United Arab Emirates, the STC controls key southern ports and population centers and has long sought an independent southern state. Riyadh, which supports Yemen’s internationally recognised government, views some STC moves—especially seizures of border provinces—as threats to Saudi security.
Tensions escalated in December 2025 when the STC expanded operations into Hadramout and Mahra, provinces that border Saudi Arabia. Riyadh described those advances as a red line and responded with targeted air strikes, including an attack on Mukalla on 30 December 2025 that it said hit a weapons shipment linked to the UAE. Abu Dhabi denied the weapons allegation and announced an end to its formal counterterrorism presence in Yemen later that day.
Main Event
According to the Saudi-led coalition’s statement on 8 January 2026, al-Zubaidi left Aden in the early hours and travelled by sea to Berbera in Somaliland. The coalition said he then boarded a plane accompanied by UAE officers and landed first in Mogadishu before continuing to Abu Dhabi. The coalition added that the aircraft deactivated its identification transponder over the Gulf of Oman, reactivating it about 10 minutes before arriving at Al Reef military airport in Abu Dhabi.
The coalition said al-Zubaidi was not present on the Yemeni Air flight that transported the STC delegation to Riyadh for planned talks on Wednesday. Following the announcement, the coalition reported strikes on STC forces in the Dhale governorate. Ground units aligned with the internationally recognised government reportedly pushed into Aden and seized the presidential palace.
Rashad al-Alimi, head of the Presidential Leadership Council, announced that al-Zubaidi had been removed from the council for “committing high treason” and said he had asked the attorney general to investigate and pursue legal action. The STC had earlier said it would attend Saudi-hosted peace negotiations, but the coalition’s account suggests its leader did not travel with the rest of the delegation.
Analysis & Implications
If the coalition’s account is accurate, al-Zubaidi’s flight to the UAE via Somaliland and Somalia would underline the extent to which external actors shape Yemen’s fractious politics. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have supported different local partners in Yemen for years; incidents like this could harden mistrust and complicate any Riyadh-mediated reconciliation. The alleged transponder shutdown also raises legal and diplomatic questions about state conduct in regional airspace and civil aviation norms.
For the STC, the loss of its leader from a visible presence in southern Yemen could affect command cohesion and local morale even as it prepares to engage in talks. For the internationally recognised government, al-Zubaidi’s removal from the Presidential Leadership Council and a pending investigation are likely to be presented domestically as a reassertion of authority. Conversely, if UAE involvement in the evacuation is confirmed, Abu Dhabi could face renewed diplomatic pressure from Riyadh and its coalition partners.
Internationally, renewed Saudi–UAE tensions risk undermining broader efforts to stabilise Yemen, including humanitarian access and anti-Houthi military coordination. The incident could also shift calculations in Mogadishu and Somaliland, where ports and air links have become strategic nodes for regional actors. Finally, a public rift among coalition partners may embolden other armed groups inside Yemen and prolong the country’s cycle of localized confrontations.
Comparison & Data
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 30 Dec 2025 | Saudi-led strikes on Mukalla targeting alleged UAE-linked shipment |
| Late Dec 2025 | STC seizes Hadramout and Mahra; Yemeni government counteroffensive follows |
| 7–8 Jan 2026 | Coalition says al-Zubaidi left Aden by boat, flew via Mogadishu to Abu Dhabi |
| 8 Jan 2026 | Al-Alimi removes al-Zubaidi from Presidential Leadership Council; investigation requested |
The table places the recent account in the context of rapid military and political changes since late December 2025. The sequence shows a pattern of territorial gains by the STC followed by forceful responses by the Saudi-led coalition and allied Yemeni government units. Those moves have also coincided with a recalibration of UAE public posture toward direct military involvement in Yemen.
Reactions & Quotes
“He escaped in the dead of night,” the coalition said, describing al-Zubaidi’s departure from Aden and subsequent flights.
Saudi-led coalition statement (claimed)
The coalition framed the account as an operational fact while using the phrase to justify subsequent military actions. The choice to highlight timing and route was presented to underscore the coalition’s narrative that the STC leader absconded rather than participated in the Riyadh talks.
“[Al-Zubaidi] has been removed from the council for committing high treason,” Rashad al-Alimi said, and he said the attorney general was asked to investigate.
Rashad al-Alimi, Presidential Leadership Council
Al-Alimi’s announcement signals an intent to pursue legal and political measures against the STC leader and to delegitimise his actions before domestic and international audiences.
“We deny that the shipment contained weapons,” an Emirati statement said regarding the Mukalla strikes; Abu Dhabi also said it would end its counterterrorism mission in Yemen.
United Arab Emirates (official statement, December 2025)
The UAE’s prior denial of the weapons allegation and its public policy shift in late December remain central to interpreting current tensions between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
Unconfirmed
- The coalition’s claim that UAE officers accompanied al-Zubaidi on the flight has not been independently verified by UAE authorities.
- The reported shutdown of the aircraft transponder over the Gulf of Oman is alleged by the coalition but lacks corroboration from independent flight-tracking or civil aviation sources.
- It remains unconfirmed whether al-Zubaidi departed Aden voluntarily to avoid detention or for other strategic reasons; motives have not been independently established.
Bottom Line
The coalition’s account that Aidarous al-Zubaidi fled to the UAE via Somaliland, if upheld, marks a flashpoint in an already strained Saudi–UAE relationship and complicates Riyadh’s mediation role in Yemen. The incident follows intense fighting in late December 2025, when the STC took key southern provinces and Saudi-backed forces counterattacked; that backdrop makes any cross-border evacuation diplomatically sensitive.
Key questions remain about the level of UAE involvement, the legality of the alleged aircraft actions, and the effect of al-Zubaidi’s absence on southern command structures and the peace process. For observers, the episode underscores how external patronage and intra-coalition rivalry continue to shape Yemen’s trajectory and the prospects for a negotiated settlement.
Sources
- Al Jazeera (International news outlet; report summarising coalition statement and subsequent developments)