On September 3, 2025, in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, China publicly displayed what analysts say completes a nuclear triad—introducing a new air-launched ballistic missile (JL-1) and two road-mobile ICBMs (DF-31BJ, DF-61)—while also parading hypersonic weapons, counter-drone systems and directed-energy arms.
Key Takeaways
- The parade marked the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and was attended by leaders including Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un.
- Beijing showcased three new nuclear-capable missiles: DF-31BJ, DF-61 (road-mobile ICBMs) and the JL-1 ALBM; a previously shown SLBM completes a triad.
- Several hypersonic anti-ship systems (YJ-17, YJ-19, YJ-20) and a land-based DF-26D variant were displayed.
- New air-defense and counter-UAS systems appeared, including a vehicle with an autocannon plus banks of missile canisters and specialist microwave and laser systems.
- The HQ-29 system was shown on a six-axle TEL; analysts note it could have anti-satellite or mid-course missile-defeat functions, but that role is not confirmed.
- A shipboard LY-1 high-energy laser and a vehicle-mounted laser were among directed-energy systems on display.
- The parade again used heavy TEL-mounted systems (eight-axle and six-axle vehicles) to signal mobility and survivability for strategic forces.
Verified Facts
Chinese authorities staged the parade on September 3, 2025, at Tiananmen Square to commemorate the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II. Senior foreign guests included Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, both seated with President Xi Jinping.
Three newly visible nuclear-capable systems drew international attention: two road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, labelled DF-31BJ and DF-61, were mounted on eight-axle transporter erector launchers (TELs). A new air-launched ballistic missile identified as the JL-1 was also displayed; it is expected to be deployable from Xi’an H-6N bombers alongside other ALBM types already in service.
Conventional and strategic extensions were also prominent. Parade footage and photographs showed hypersonic anti-ship missiles identified as YJ-17, YJ-19 and YJ-20, plus a land-based DF-26D variant. A multi-role air-defence system marked HQ-29 was carried on a six-axle TEL, with two canistered missiles visible per launcher.
Counter-unmanned aerial-system (C-UAS) platforms were present, including a 6×6 truck-mounted turret integrating an autocannon and two banks of 12 missile canisters. Observers compared the configuration to CASIC’s FK-3000-series displays that previously showed denser canister arrays; the appearing layout suggests significant magazine depth when combined with kinetic guns.
Context & Impact
The public unveiling signals Beijing’s intent to demonstrate strategic breadth: mobile ICBMs increase survivability, ALBMs extend air-launched strike options, and SLBMs (previously revealed) complete triad redundancy. Such visibility aims both at domestic political messaging and international deterrence signaling.
Directed-energy and C-UAS systems underscore a growing emphasis on countering unmanned and near-space threats. If HQ-29 or similar systems have anti-satellite or mid-course ballistic-missile-defeat capabilities, they would represent a notable upgrade to China’s counter-space and missile-defense toolkit.
Regional security implications include heightened concern among U.S. allies in East Asia and greater emphasis on missile defense and counter-hypersonic measures. The parade may accelerate defence planning and procurement in nearby states and prompt diplomatic calls for arms control engagement.
- Potential operational impacts: increased dispersal of nuclear forces, new maritime strike reach via ALBMs, and more layered air and space defenses.
- Diplomatic impacts: an elevated focus on arms control, space security, and regional missile-defense cooperation.
The event was described by state media as a ceremony to honor the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and a showcase of the armed forces’ modern capabilities.
Chinese state media
Unconfirmed
- Whether the HQ-29 is designed primarily as an anti-satellite interceptor, a mid-course missile-defeat system, or both remains unconfirmed by independent sources.
- Operational status and unit-level deployment timelines for DF-31BJ, DF-61 and JL-1 have not been publicly verified.
- Exact interceptor counts and magazine capacities inferred from parade visuals (for example, the 96-interceptor estimate when comparing canister banks) are approximate.
Bottom Line
The parade offered a broad display of Beijing’s advancing strike and defensive systems, from new ICBMs and an ALBM to hypersonic and directed-energy weapons. While some technical roles — particularly for HQ-29 — require confirmation, the overall presentation aims to signal enhanced deterrence, survivability and anti-access capabilities.
Expect increased allied scrutiny, renewed calls for transparency on space and missile capabilities, and pressure for diplomatic channels to address strategic stability risks in the near term.