Lead
Adrian Woolfson’s new book argues that a biological revolution is imminent, one that could let humans design entirely new species. In a review published on 4 February 2026, the author’s case links breakthroughs in large-scale DNA synthesis and AI-driven protein prediction to a near-term shift from describing life to engineering it. Woolfson warns of vast benefits—new medicines, drought-resistant crops and even biofabricated housing—alongside serious risks including biothreats and ecological disruption. His tone mixes alarm and optimism, urging public discussion and controls even as he doubts simple bans will work.
Key takeaways
- Two technological leaps underpin the thesis: high-throughput genome synthesis (e.g., Caltech’s Sidewinder method) and AI protein-folding breakthroughs such as AlphaFold2 (2020).
- AlphaFold2 enabled reliable prediction of protein 3D structure, removing a major bottleneck in designing novel proteins for medicine and industry.
- Woolfson, founder of Genyro, sees synthetic species as potential producers of biofuels, medicines, biosensors and drought-resistant crops, and even as material builders for habitats.
- He frames the turning point as a “second Genesis,” predicting engineered organisms will soon cohabit with evolution-shaped species, blurring natural/artificial distinctions.
- Risks highlighted include the easier creation of novel pathogens, proliferation of benchtop DNA synthesis, and possible ecological effects from tinkering with bacteriophages that influence ocean carbon cycles.
- Woolfson supports bans on designer babies and parentless humans but contends a broad moratorium on AI-driven genomics would be unrealistic and harmful to potential gains.
- The book mixes clear technical explanation with rhetorical flourish; critics may judge some claims overstated though the underlying technical advances are well documented.
Background
Human cultures have long imagined hybrid creatures—Ezekiel’s four beasts, the Buraq from Islamic tradition and the Greek centaur—all examples Woolfson uses to show a deep-rooted impulse to combine anatomical traits. That cultural lineage frames a modern scientific question: once we can make organisms intentionally, how should society judge and manage them? Woolfson situates his argument at the intersection of molecular biology, synthetic genomics and machine learning, tracing the recent acceleration in capabilities to concrete milestones in lab methods and computational design.
Two technical threads converge: DNA synthesis technologies that can assemble ever-larger genome-sized fragments, and AI tools that predict protein shapes from amino-acid sequences with confidence. The former lowers the time and cost to build genomes; the latter removes a principal design uncertainty by making protein function more predictable. Together they convert biology from a primarily observational science—cataloguing and classifying life—into a generative discipline capable of constructing new biological systems.
Main event
Woolfson’s narrative describes how a method like Caltech’s Sidewinder accelerates DNA assembly, enabling creation of sequences of unprecedented length and complexity. He pairs that with the arrival of AlphaFold2 in 2020, which used neural networks to solve protein-folding prediction and thereby unlocked the ability to rationally design proteins. The combination, he argues, reduces previously insurmountable uncertainties in creating organisms with intended functions.
The book catalogs near-term applications: designer enzymes for industrial chemistry, synthetic microbes that sequester carbon or produce fuels, and engineered crops tailored for water-poor soils. Woolfson also speculates about more ambitious projects—organisms with novel structural materials that could be grown into dwellings rather than constructed with traditional methods. He presents these ideas as realistic extensions of current research rather than pure fantasy.
Equally detailed are the hazards he describes. Cheaper DNA synthesis and accessible AI raise dual-use concerns: the same techniques that enable benign innovation could be repurposed to assemble harmful agents. He highlights bacteriophage engineering as an area where unintended ecological effects—such as perturbations to marine microbial food webs and carbon cycling—could have climate consequences. Woolfson presses for governance, but is skeptical about blanket prohibitions on research driven by AI-genomics.
Analysis & implications
Woolfson’s central claim—that biology is moving from description to generation—has wide implications for science, policy and ethics. If researchers can routinely design proteins and genomes, the pace of biological innovation could accelerate dramatically, shortening timelines for new therapeutics, biomaterials and agrobiotech. That acceleration raises regulatory challenges: risk assessment, monitoring and international coordination will be harder when tools and protocols spread widely, including to small labs or even hobbyist settings.
The environmental implications merit special attention. Engineered microbes released intentionally or accidentally could compete with or alter ecological networks; phage manipulation could shift bacterial community composition and, by extension, biogeochemical cycles such as carbon sequestration. These are plausible pathways, but their magnitude and probability are uncertain and will depend on context, containment practices and post-release monitoring systems.
On ethics, the tension between potential benefit and the “yuck” factor of hybridization forces hard conversations. Woolfson rejects designer babies while supporting many forms of genetic engineering; his stance illustrates a broader societal dilemma about where to draw moral and legal boundaries. Public engagement is essential because technical experts alone cannot determine the social license for deep interventions into life’s architecture.
Geopolitically, the distributed nature of synthetic biology raises proliferation risks: nations and non-state actors may pursue different standards, and enforcement mechanisms could lag behind capability diffusion. International frameworks—analogous to those for nuclear or chemical risks—may be needed, but designing them will require balancing innovation incentives with safeguards that are practical and verifiable.
Comparison & data
| Capability | Milestone | Near-term impact |
|---|---|---|
| Protein prediction | AlphaFold2 (2020) | Enables rational protein design for medicine and industry |
| Genome synthesis | Sidewinder-like assembly methods | Faster, larger DNA constructs — whole-genome builds feasible |
| Accessibility | Benchtop synthesis + open AI tools | Lower barriers for small labs; raises monitoring gaps |
The table maps core technologies to milestones and immediate consequences. While timelines vary, the qualitative shift—from trial-and-error to design-led workflow—is already visible in academic and commercial projects. That shift magnifies both upside (targeted therapeutics, resilient crops) and downside (dual-use risks, ecological uncertainty), reinforcing the need for cross-disciplinary risk assessment.
Reactions & quotes
“Biology now stands at the threshold of transitioning from a largely descriptive science into a generative one,” Woolfson argues, framing the technical advances as a paradigm change.
Adrian Woolfson / book
Experts in protein design and synthetic biology note AlphaFold2 transformed structural prediction in 2020, opening avenues for designed enzymes and therapeutics once thought impractical.
Computational biology community (paraphrased)
Biosecurity advocates warn that easier DNA assembly and AI-driven design will complicate oversight and could make the accidental or deliberate creation of dangerous agents more likely if governance lags.
Biosecurity researchers (summary)
Unconfirmed
- The degree to which engineered bacteriophages would destabilize global carbon cycles remains theoretical and requires empirical study before firm conclusions can be drawn.
- Predictions that half-human hybrids could appear are speculative; current technical, ethical and legal barriers make such outcomes highly uncertain.
- The effectiveness of a global moratorium on AI-led genomics is debated—claims that it would categorically fail are projections, not established fact.
Bottom line
Woolfson’s book is an urgent synthesis of technical milestones and ethical stakes: DNA synthesis and AI-driven protein design make intentional creation of life forms increasingly plausible, with both transformative benefits and significant risks. The most defensible policy response combines measured regulation, international coordination and transparent public engagement rather than blanket bans that are likely unenforceable.
Readers should take away two practical points: first, the technical advances Woolfson cites—AlphaFold2 (2020) and high-capacity assembly methods—are real and materially change what researchers can attempt; second, the social, environmental and security consequences are complex and uncertain, so anticipatory governance and investment in detection and containment are essential. How society chooses to steward these capabilities will shape ecosystems, economies and ethics for decades.