Lead: Protests that began in Iran in late December over rising living costs have broadened into a wider challenge to the country’s religious leadership. State media say more than 100 security personnel have been killed in recent days, while opposition activists report a higher toll including dozens of protesters; neither figure can be independently verified. Demonstrations have taken place across Iran and have prompted solidarity rallies by diaspora communities in Europe and North America. The unrest is exposing a fragmented opposition landscape made up of inside-the-country movements, exile organisations and ethnic minority groups.
Key takeaways
- Protests began in late December over soaring prices and economic grievances and quickly expanded into broader anti-regime demonstrations across many cities.
- State media reported more than 100 security personnel killed in the recent unrest; opposition activists say the death toll is higher and includes dozens of civilians — these figures are unverified.
- There is no single, unified opposition leadership inside Iran; activists rely on decentralised networks, local organisers and social media for mobilisation.
- Exiled groups include monarchists led by Reza Pahlavi, the National Council of Resistance led by Maryam Rajavi (associated with the MEK), and newer coalitions such as Hamgami formed in 2023.
- Kurdish and Baluch regions have been centres of sustained dissent; ethnic and sectarian grievances complicate a single national opposition project.
- Historical moments such as the 2009 Green Movement and the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests shape current tactics and participants’ distrust of central organisers.
Background
Iran’s modern political cleavages trace back to the 1950s and the 1979 revolution. Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalised Iran’s oil industry in 1951 and was removed in a 1953 coup that involved the United States and the United Kingdom; the Pahlavi monarchy was later toppled in 1979 and the shah fled the country, dying in exile in Egypt in 1980. Since the Islamic Republic’s founding, successive waves of unrest have produced diverse opposition currents, from reformists to monarchists, leftist guerrillas and ethno-sectarian movements.
The 2009 Green Movement followed a contested presidential election and produced large, leaderless street demonstrations; Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi emerged as symbolic figures but were placed under house arrest in 2011, with Karroubi’s confinement officially lifted in March 2025. The 2022 protests triggered by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in morality-police custody further broadened diaspora mobilisation and revived debates about leadership, methods and objectives among opponents of the regime.
Main event
The late-December protests began with economic grievances — price shocks and cost-of-living pressures — and have expanded into direct political demands against the clerical establishment. Demonstrations have occurred in provincial cities as well as Tehran, with many protests organised through neighbourhood networks, university groups and online platforms including encrypted and semi-encrypted services. The use of decentralised organising has made it difficult for authorities to anticipate every flashpoint but has also prevented the emergence of a single recognised leader around whom protesters unite.
Outside Iran, members of the diaspora have organised solidarity rallies in the United Kingdom, Germany and elsewhere; some of those demonstrations carried images of Reza Pahlavi and chants in support of exile figures. Inside Iran, reports describe swift security crackdowns in several cities, arrests of activists and clashes between demonstrators and security forces. State outlets say more than 100 members of the security forces have been killed in recent days, while opposition networks report larger civilian casualties — both claims remain contested.
Several exiled organisations have attempted to capitalise on the unrest. Reza Pahlavi, 65 and the son of the last shah, presents himself as an advocate for a secular democratic system decided by referendum, although many monarchists explicitly want the monarchy restored. The Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), led publicly by Maryam Rajavi in exile, remains influential in parts of the diaspora but has limited visible footing inside Iran and carries a controversial history including alignment with Iraq during the 1980–1988 war and allegations of cult-like internal practices.
Analysis & implications
The lack of a single, recognised leadership inside Iran reduces the prospect of a rapid negotiated transition. Decentralised movements are resilient and harder to decapitate but they also lack the coherence needed to consolidate power or present a clear post-regime programme. Analysts note that decades of repression have suppressed durable organisational channels inside Iran, so protests tend to form around spontaneous local leadership rather than a central command.
Exiled figures such as Reza Pahlavi enjoy symbolic resonance among parts of the diaspora and some segments of the population who remember the pre-1979 era, but their appeal is uneven inside Iran. Many younger Iranians have no lived memory of the monarchy and are more likely to prioritise civil liberties and social freedoms over restorationist agendas. That generational gap complicates alliance-building between inside activists and exile elites.
Ethnic minority dynamics — notably in Kurdish and Baluch areas — add another layer of complexity. Kurdish and Baluch communities have longstanding grievances over political marginalisation and economic neglect, and protests often run strongest in those provinces. Armed groups with separatist or militant orientations exist in some border regions; the presence of such actors raises the risk of localized escalation that could harden the government’s security response and complicate any future settlements.
Comparison & data
| Category | Share / Number |
|---|---|
| Population (total) | ~92 million |
| Persians | ~61% |
| Azerbaijanis | ~16% |
| Kurds | ~10% |
| Lurs | ~6% |
| Arabs | ~2% |
| Baluchis | ~2% |
| Religious make-up | Shia ~90%, Sunni ~9%, others ~1% |
| Religious minorities (approx.) | Baha’i 300,000; Christians 300,000; Zoroastrians 35,000; Jews 20,000; Sabean-Mandeans 10,000 |
These figures help explain why protests vary regionally: provinces with concentrated Kurdish or Baluch populations have historically produced distinct political dynamics and, at times, stronger anti-government mobilisation. The demographic picture also highlights why an opposition that relies on a single national narrative faces practical obstacles.
Reactions & quotes
State media and government spokespeople have framed the unrest as the work of violent elements and foreign-backed plots and emphasised security responses. Opposition activists and diaspora groups characterise the disturbances as popular uprisings against economic mismanagement and clerical rule. Below are representative statements and their context.
‘Iran lacks a single opposition force capable of forming a government, and inside activists have been too vulnerable to produce a clear leader.’
Shahram Akbarzadeh, Deakin University (academic)
Akbarzadeh’s observation was cited in analysis of why protests have not unified behind an inside figure; he highlights repression and risk as drivers of decentralised tactics rather than centralised leadership.
‘The state has systematically suppressed organised opposition, leaving protest movements dependent on ad hoc networks rather than stable institutions.’
Maryam Alemzadeh, University of Oxford (academic)
Alemzadeh’s comment frames the historical pattern of arrests and the curtailing of NGOs, unions and student bodies, which she says diminishes both leadership formation and predictable mobilisation channels.
‘More than 100 members of security forces have been killed in recent days,’
State media (official)
State outlets released the casualty figure as part of a broader account blaming violent elements; independent verification of that number and of claims about civilian deaths remains incomplete.
Unconfirmed
- Exact casualty totals: state media’s report of more than 100 security personnel killed and opposition claims of higher civilian deaths have not been independently verified.
- The extent of domestic popular support for Reza Pahlavi remains unclear; some street chanting has been reported, but nationwide backing is unconfirmed.
- Allegations that foreign intelligence services directly aided exile media campaigns (reported in some outlets) have not been substantiated to an independent standard.
Bottom line
The immediate picture is of an insurgent-style, decentralised protest movement driven by economic pain and political grievances rather than by a coordinated national opposition. That structure gives the movement strength — in adaptability and local resilience — but poses a major obstacle to translating street momentum into an organised transition plan. Exiled groups supply symbolic leadership and international visibility but so far lack credible in-country organisational depth to manage state functions or security institutions.
How the crisis evolves will depend on three main variables: the durability of local networks under repression, the response calculus of the security services, and whether disparate opposition elements can coalesce around shared minimal goals. For observers and policymakers, the key issue is whether protests widen into sustained civil disobedience that undermines the state’s capacity, or whether the regime’s security apparatus can contain unrest while tolerating limited economic and political concessions.