Lead: Over the past decade the Los Angeles Police Department sent officers to Israel and to other countries for seminars and training, but an Office of the Inspector General report released in February 2026 found the department cannot explain what most participants learned. The review examined 117 foreign training activities attended by 243 LAPD employees since 2014 and found routine failures to document takeaways, vet foreign contacts, or track funding. Those gaps make it impossible to verify whether tactics or programs were adopted, and they raise questions about oversight, foreign influence and public accountability. LAPD officials told the Police Commission they are building improved travel-tracking systems after the report’s release.
Key Takeaways
- Inspector General review covered 117 foreign training activities attended by 243 LAPD employees from 2014 through the report’s publication.
- At least nine visits to Israel occurred in the last decade; the report identified 18 Israel trips since 2014 costing a combined $87,000.
- The department sent a deputy chief and seven others to a federally funded “Command and Control Counter-Terrorism” event that cost $52,470 under a federal grant.
- Roughly 80% of overseas trips were financed by outside sources (police foundations, grants), and recordkeeping was weaker when third parties paid travel expenses.
- About 25% of documented trips were to Canada to study human-trafficking investigations and clandestine drug labs.
- Lack of documentation—often only a brief travel statement—left inspectors “unable to evaluate the key takeaways and potential benefits.”
- The LAPD lacked processes to assess security risks in host countries or vet whether foreign contacts had intelligence or extremist affiliations.
- Records created prior to 2021 were often deleted under data-retention rules, limiting historical review.
Background
The LAPD has a decades-long practice of exchange and training visits with foreign law enforcement, including Israeli security forces since the 1980s and an increase in exchanges after the 2001 terrorist attacks. Agency officials have said those relationships were intended to share counterterrorism and investigative techniques as cities confront transnational organized crime and extremist threats. In recent years LAPD travel has included conferences and exchanges across Europe, Asia, Latin America and North America related to aviation, crowd-control, child-exploitation investigations and other specialties.
The practice has drawn heightened scrutiny amid Israel’s military campaign against Hamas in Gaza, which has resulted in tens of thousands of reported deaths and allegations of war crimes by critics. Civil rights groups and some community organizations have questioned whether exchanges with security services accused of rights abuses create reputational risks or transmit problematic tactics. The inspector general’s review was requested to assess whether foreign training materially benefited LAPD operations and whether oversight was adequate.
Main Event
The inspector general’s office examined departmental policies and travel records tied to foreign training and found inconsistent documentation. Participants commonly filed short trip summaries but rarely produced formal evaluations outlining actionable lessons or potential departmental applications. Because of those gaps, report authors concluded the department could not substantiate officials’ repeated assertions that no tactics, policies, or training programs had been changed as a result of the trips.
The report cataloged travel to a wide array of countries: multiple visits to Canada focused on trafficking and clandestine labs, training on crowd-control with Royal Thai Police and Austrian authorities, police aviation gatherings in Colombia, the U.K., Mexico, Germany and Poland, and Interpol-led sessions in Singapore, France and England on crimes against children. For Israel specifically, the review identified 18 trips by LAPD personnel since 2014 that together cost $87,000; one delegation to a ‘‘Command and Control Counter-Terrorism’’ event included a deputy chief and seven staff and was federally funded ($52,470).
Investigators also found insufficient vetting of foreign contacts and no formal process to identify security risks posed by host-country partners. In many cases outside funding—from foundations or foreign agencies—covered travel expenses; when someone else paid, LAPD participants faced few internal requirements to justify or evaluate their participation. At a Police Commission meeting, LAPD leaders acknowledged shortcomings and said they were developing a new tracking mechanism for overseas travel.
Analysis & Implications
The absence of standardized reporting and retention practices creates several governance risks. First, without clear records it is impossible to determine whether foreign training introduced techniques that conflict with LAPD policy or civil-rights protections. That uncertainty undermines public trust, especially when exchanges involve countries criticized for human-rights practices. Second, external funding for travel introduces potential conflicts of interest or the appearance of influence; the inspector general warned that anonymity of donors can increase reputational risk.
Third, inadequate vetting of foreign contacts poses operational security concerns. The report found no routine checks against U.S. national-security or intelligence databases to confirm whether hosts or presenters had affiliations with foreign intelligence services or extremist groups. For a municipal police force operating in a globalized threat environment, those gaps could expose officers or sensitive tactics to compromise.
Finally, the timing is consequential: with Los Angeles preparing to host the Olympics, the LAPD’s international learning and partnership strategy will be under greater public and political scrutiny. Effective, transparent tracking of who trains with whom and what is learned will be critical to both operational readiness and community acceptance of any adopted practices.
Comparison & Data
| Country/Region | Approx. Share of Trips | Primary Focus |
|---|---|---|
| Canada | ~25% of trips (≈29 of 117) | Human-trafficking investigations, clandestine drug labs |
| Israel | At least 9 visits in last decade; 18 trips since 2014 | Counterterrorism, command-and-control |
| Italy & France | Multiple | Olympics-related planning and security |
| Thailand, Austria | Several | Crowd-control tactics |
| Colombia, U.K., Mexico, Germany, Poland | Selected aviation conventions | Police aviation operations |
| Singapore, France, England | Selected | Interpol training on crimes against children |
The table summarizes the distribution and themes of the 117 foreign training activities reviewed. Exact trip counts beyond the items identified in the report are approximate because many historical records were deleted under data-retention rules, limiting precise tallies.
Reactions & Quotes
Community advocates and civil-rights groups called for greater transparency and stricter oversight of foreign exchanges, noting the potential for bias and unexamined policy transfer.
“What are they learning, what are they bringing back home? All of that is not documented and is concerning,”
Amr Shabaik, Legal Director, Council on American-Islamic Relations — Greater Los Angeles
The inspector general emphasized that the record shortfalls prevented a meaningful evaluation of benefits.
Investigators said they were “unable to evaluate the key takeaways and potential benefits” because documentation was incomplete or absent.
Office of the Inspector General, Los Angeles Police Commission (official report)
At the Police Commission meeting LAPD leaders acknowledged the gaps and announced steps to improve oversight and recordkeeping.
LAPD officials said the department is creating a better travel-tracking system and reviewing record-retention practices to prevent future information loss.
Los Angeles Police Department (agency statement at Police Commission meeting)
Unconfirmed
- Whether any specific tactics or policies from foreign training have been adopted by LAPD remains unverified due to missing documentation.
- The full contents of travel-related records deleted before 2021 are not recoverable and thus the historical record of some trips is incomplete.
- Whether any foreign contacts encountered by LAPD personnel were affiliated with intelligence services or extremist groups could not be confirmed from available records.
Bottom Line
The inspector general’s report casts doubt on the LAPD’s ability to demonstrate how international training investments translate into departmental improvements. Without standardized documentation, vetting and disclosure rules, the department faces operational risks and reputational exposure—particularly when exchanges involve partners under human-rights scrutiny.
Fixing the problem will require concrete policy changes: mandatory, detailed post-travel evaluations; centralized recordkeeping; routine vetting of foreign contacts against U.S. security lists; and transparent reporting of external funding for travel. As Los Angeles prepares for major international events and continues confronting globalized criminal threats, building those controls will be essential to preserving public trust and ensuring accountability.