Lead: On 6 December 2025 at the Doha Forum, Qatar and Egypt urged an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the rapid deployment of an international stabilisation force to permit the next phase of a US- and UN-backed ceasefire plan. The two guarantors said those steps are prerequisites for fully implementing the fragile agreement that has paused large-scale hostilities. They stressed that progress depends on verified redeployment behind the so-called “yellow line,” measures to secure civilians and an agreed transition to interim Palestinian administration. Officials warned the truce could unravel unless withdrawal and stabilisation move ahead promptly.
Key takeaways
- Qatar and Egypt formally called for Israeli troops to pull back behind the “yellow line” and for an international stabilisation force to deploy as the next step in the Gaza ceasefire plan, statements made at the Doha Forum on 6 December 2025.
- The ceasefire’s initial phase saw a halt to broad combat, release of remaining living hostages and transfer of most deceased remains; one deceased remains unaccounted for in public reports.
- The plan endorsed by the UN in November foresees a transitional “Board of Peace,” Israeli withdrawal, and a stabilisation force; names and command arrangements for that force remain unresolved.
- Hamas has said it would place weapons under the authority of a Palestinian state only after an end to occupation, while the US-proposed 20-point plan includes conditional disarmament and relocation for those who decommission arms.
- Egypt rejected Israeli statements that Rafah would open only for exit to Egypt, insisting the crossing must allow inbound aid and not serve as a route for displacement.
- Turkey signalled interest in contributing to a stabilisation force but highlighted concerns over command, rules of engagement and separation of civilians from combatants.
- Arab and Muslim states have expressed reluctance to join a force that might engage Palestinian militants, complicating force composition and regional buy-in.
Background
The ceasefire plan, developed with US and UN backing and publicly outlined in November, aimed to stop large-scale fighting in Gaza and create a pathway toward a temporary transitional authority. Its first phase required Israeli forces to withdraw behind a clearly demarcated “yellow line” inside Gaza while Hamas released living hostages and handed over the remains of those killed. That sequence largely paused broader combat, but both sides have since accused each other of violations, leaving implementation fragile.
Qatar and Egypt emerged as leading guarantors during the negotiations that led to the truce, using diplomatic channels to shuttle between Israel, Palestinian representatives and external stakeholders. The plan envisions a 20-point sequence that includes disarmament measures for Hamas, the institution of a transitional Board of Peace to administer Gaza, and deployment of an international stabilisation force to verify compliance and protect civilians. Each element has political and operational complications: disarmament is politically contentious, the Board’s membership is unresolved, and regional states are wary of contributing troops that might confront militants.
Main event
At the Doha Forum on 6 December 2025 Qatar’s prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, said a ceasefire cannot be completed without a full Israeli withdrawal and rapid deployment of an international force to restore stability. He described the moment as “critical” and framed withdrawal as the necessary next step to move from a fragile pause to sustainable calm. Egypt’s foreign minister, Badr Abdelatty, echoed the call and pressed for verification along the yellow line to make the truce durable.
Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, told the forum that talks over the stabilisation force are ongoing and emphasised the need for clarity on its command structure and contributors. Fidan said the force’s first goal should be to separate Israelis and Palestinians on the ground, a formulation intended to minimise direct confrontations between troops and civilians. Turkey signalled interest in participating, but noted that Israeli reactions to Turkish involvement remain sensitive.
Hamas’s negotiator, Khalil al-Hayya, reiterated that the group ties its weapons to the presence of occupation and would only place arms under state authority if occupation ends. That stance preserves Hamas’s leverage over the pace and sequencing of disarmament in any second phase. Meanwhile, Israel has stated it will open Rafah crossing “exclusively for exit” to Egypt, a position swiftly rejected by Egypt, which said Rafah must allow inbound aid and not be a channel for forced displacement.
Analysis & implications
If guarantors secure a verified Israeli pullback and deploy an effective stabilisation force, the truce could transition into a managed interim governance period and substantially reduce large-scale violence. A credible international presence could deter frontline incidents, provide monitoring and foster confidence for further steps such as aid flows and institution-building. But the force’s composition and mandate will determine whether it is accepted by local populations and regional capitals.
The disarmament component poses the most acute political barrier. The US-proposed 20-point plan ties decommissioning to safe movement and political guarantees; yet Hamas’s public linkage of arms to the occupation undercuts immediate compliance. Forcing disarmament before credible withdrawal risks reigniting hostilities, while indefinite delays risk entrenching a parallel security order under armed factions.
Regional reluctance to take combat risks against Palestinian militants complicates force planning. Arab and Muslim states fear domestic backlash if their troops act against Palestinians; Israel has concerns about forces that might constrain its security operations. Absent a broadly accepted multinational footprint with a clear, limited mandate and robust rules of engagement, the stabilisation force may be too weak to prevent local incidents or too politically toxic to assemble.
Diplomatic pressure on Israeli leadership appears essential. Forum participants urged US engagement with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to ensure Israeli compliance; diplomats warned that without strong external management the phased plan could stall or collapse. The scenario underscores that the ceasefire’s technical measures are inseparable from high-level political commitments.
Comparison & data
| Phase | Core requirements | Status (as of 6 Dec 2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 | Israeli pullback behind yellow line; release of remaining living hostages; transfer of most remains | Partially implemented: hostages released; some pullback; frequent local violations reported |
| Phase 2 | Disarmament framework; Board of Peace established; international stabilisation force deployed | Not yet implemented: disputes over disarmament, force composition, and Board membership |
The table above summarizes the plan’s two-stage structure. Phase 1 reduced large-scale combat but saw recurring tensions near the yellow line. Phase 2’s elements—disarmament, transitional governance and stabilization—are unresolved and hinge on political agreements about sequencing and guarantees.
Reactions & quotes
Official and expert reactions at the Doha Forum highlighted both urgency and obstacles. Qatar and Egypt positioned withdrawal and stabilisation as non-negotiable next steps; Turkey emphasized practical command issues and separation of civilians.
“Now we are at the critical moment … A ceasefire cannot be completed unless there is a full withdrawal of the Israeli forces (and) there is stability back in Gaza.”
Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatari prime minister
The Qatari statement framed withdrawal as the trigger for further implementation and for de-escalation of daily incidents along the yellow line.
“We need to deploy this force as soon as possible on the ground because one party, which is Israel, is every day violating the ceasefire.”
Badr Abdelatty, Egyptian foreign minister
Egypt underscored verification and monitoring along the yellow line and rejected any use of Rafah as a pathway for displacement.
“Our weapons are linked to the existence of the occupation and the aggression. If the occupation ends, these weapons will be placed under the authority of the state.”
Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas negotiator
Hamas’s public formulation connects disarmament directly to political outcomes, complicating immediate implementation of Phase 2.
Unconfirmed
- Exact membership and command structure of the international stabilisation force remain unannounced and subject to ongoing negotiation.
- Whether Rafah will be opened both ways for aid and movement or limited to exit-only passages has been disputed between Israel and Egypt and remains unresolved.
- Formal timelines for Hamas’s disarmament under the 20-point plan and the mechanism for verifying decommissioning have not been publicly agreed.
Bottom line
The guarantors’ call on 6 December 2025 reiterates that tactical pauses produced by the ceasefire are insufficient without political and operational follow-through: verified Israeli withdrawal, a credible stabilisation presence and workable arrangements for interim governance are all needed to prevent a return to full-scale fighting. Achieving those steps requires synchronized pressure from guarantor states and clear, enforceable mechanisms for verification and accountability.
Absent agreement on force composition, command and sequencing—especially regarding disarmament—the plan risks stagnation. International diplomacy over the coming days will be decisive: the guarantors must convert statements of intent into enforceable, verifiable actions or face a renewed cycle of violence and humanitarian deterioration in Gaza.
Sources
- The Guardian (press) — primary reporting on Doha Forum remarks and ceasefire plan