Lead: On 24 February 2022, as missiles began to fall on Kyiv, few outside Ukraine expected a full-scale invasion to succeed so quickly—or to last so long. Four years later, the campaign that Moscow called a “special military operation” has become a grinding, costly war that has reshaped battlefield realities, strained the Russian economy, and altered global alignments. Initial Kremlin calculations that Kyiv would fall within days proved gravely mistaken; the human and material toll has been severe on both sides. The remainder of this report unpacks what went wrong for Moscow, how the war has changed Russia’s standing, and what the next phase may bring.
Key takeaways
- Moscow assumed a rapid victory: RUSI analysis shows Russian planners expected to seize major objectives inside about 10 days in February 2022; that timeline collapsed within weeks.
- Massive casualties: CSIS estimates nearly 1.2 million Russian dead and wounded since the 2022 invasion, with separate estimates placing Russian fatalities at roughly 325,000 over four years.
- Ukrainian losses: Ukraine’s dead and wounded are estimated between 500,000 and 600,000, illustrating the war’s extreme human cost on both sides.
- Economic distortions at home: Despite an initial sanctions shock, Russia’s economy grew—reaching the IMF’s 9th-largest ranking in 2025—but faces hidden strains from higher military spending and labor shortages in civilian industries.
- Rising recruitment costs: The state and private contractors now offer large enlistment bonuses and death payouts, adding fiscal pressure and signaling manpower shortfalls.
- Diplomatic backfire: One stated Kremlin aim—to curb NATO expansion—failed: Finland and Sweden joined NATO after the 2022 invasion, increasing allied borders with Russia.
- Pivot to the East: Western isolation pushed Russia closer to China; analysts say the relationship has become asymmetric, giving Beijing more leverage over Moscow.
Background
For years before February 2022, many analysts assumed Vladimir Putin’s use of force would be limited and calibrated—Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, and the 2014 annexation of Crimea suggested a pattern of selective interventions with manageable costs. Those precedents led some Western and local observers to underestimate Ukraine’s capacity to resist a full-scale assault and to overestimate the Kremlin’s ability to achieve quick, decisive results. Russian planners, according to think-tank reconstructions, expected major territorial gains in a matter of days; that expectation shaped operational plans and political messaging inside Moscow.
Those assumptions collided with reality. Ukrainian forces and volunteer formations mounted unexpectedly stiff resistance, and Western military aid and intelligence amplified Kyiv’s defensive capacity. As the war settled into protracted attrition, Moscow’s force structure and logistics were exposed, and the combat became a test of manpower, munitions production and supply lines rather than of rapid maneuver. At the same time, domestic information control inside Russia has made an accurate public accounting of costs difficult to verify, leaving analysts to rely on open-source, governmental and think-tank estimates.
Main event
The opening hours of the invasion in late February 2022 surprised many in Kyiv and abroad because they upended long-held expectations that Russia would either avoid a large-scale invasion or achieve quick victories. Instead, columns stalled, supply chains broke down and urban warfare proved costly to attacker and defender alike. Over the following months and years, frontlines hardened in eastern and southern Ukraine, while international support for Kyiv—training, weapons and financial aid—intensified.
Operational misjudgments cascaded: command-and-control problems, underestimates of Ukrainian morale and resilience, and logistical bottlenecks contributed to heavy Russian losses. Independent researchers later concluded that many Russian assumptions about speed, local support and the breakdown of Ukrainian forces were simply wrong. That miscalculation forced Moscow to adapt tactics, deepen mobilization efforts and redirect industrial capacity to sustain prolonged combat.
On the home front, a wartime economy masked strains. Energy exports cushioned budgetary pressure and helped the Russian economy rebound in headline GDP rankings by 2025, but shortages in skilled civilian labor and inflationary pressures—visible in sharply higher food prices, including the doubling of cucumber prices since December—show deeper stress. Large enlistment bonuses and payouts for the families of the fallen became commonplace, underscoring the human cost and the state’s need to sustain personnel levels.
Analysis & implications
The strategic failure of a quick campaign has multiple consequences. Militarily, the Kremlin’s inability to secure fast, decisive results has degraded parts of Russia’s conventional force projection and exposed vulnerabilities in doctrine, mobilization and logistics. Sustained attrition is expensive: casualties and materiel losses reduce operational flexibility and require long-term industrial and fiscal commitments to replace. Politically, the war’s length complicates Moscow’s domestic messaging and places stress on social cohesion, especially as economic pain becomes more visible in everyday markets.
Economically, energy revenues allowed Russia to absorb initial sanctions and reorganize trade, but dependence on high commodity prices is not a durable substitute for a diversified economy. Prioritizing military production and redirecting workers to defense manufacturing have created shortages elsewhere, with one pro-Kremlin outlet citing needs for hundreds of thousands of blue-collar workers in civilian sectors. Those structural shifts can slow growth, raise consumer prices and generate political friction if living costs keep rising.
Diplomatically, the invasion achieved the opposite of some Kremlin goals. NATO’s expansion to include Sweden and Finland directly countered Moscow’s objective of preventing enlargement, and the West’s sanctions regime pushed Russia into a closer alignment with China. Think tanks now describe the relationship with Beijing as asymmetric, giving China leverage in trade, technology access and diplomatic support. That pivot limits Russia’s strategic autonomy and may complicate its long-term geopolitical ambitions.
Comparison & data
| Metric | Estimate | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Russian dead (4 years) | ~325,000 | CSIS-derived estimate of fatalities over the conflict’s first four years |
| Russian dead & wounded | ~1.2 million | CSIS total casualties (dead + wounded) |
| Ukrainian dead & wounded | 500,000–600,000 | Published ranges from multiple sources |
These figures, while compiled from open-source and institutional estimates, illustrate the scale of attrition and the unusual intensity of this post-1945 European war. Analysts stress caution: different methodologies yield different totals, but all independent tallies agree the human cost is exceptionally high compared with other postwar conflicts.
Reactions & quotes
Government and expert responses reflect competing framings: Kyiv emphasizes attrition of Russian manpower; Moscow highlights resilience and necessity. Below are representative statements, with surrounding context.
“They view people as a resource and shortages are already evident.”
Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine defense minister
Context: Ukraine’s leadership frames Russian manpower policies as unsustainable and publicizes figures to pressure international support. Kyiv’s counting of enemy losses is part of a broader operational narrative aimed at weakening Russian recruiting and morale.
“Russia has clearly become the junior partner, primarily due to its limited economic alternatives.”
Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)
Context: CEPA analysts argue that sanctions and isolation pushed Moscow toward deeper economic dependence on China, altering the balance in bilateral relations and reducing Russian leverage in Eurasia.
“Higher than all casualties suffered by any major power in any war since World War II.”
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Context: CSIS placed the conflict’s casualty totals in a broad historical frame to highlight the exceptional human cost; the institute’s estimates have become a frequent reference point for journalists and policymakers, though they rely on multiple sources and modelling assumptions.
Unconfirmed
- Exact casualty totals: Official Russian figures remain opaque, so published tallies are estimates that may be revised with new data.
- Claims of 35,000 Russian troops killed in December: cited by Ukrainian officials, this monthly figure has not been independently verified by neutral observers.
- Long-term economic rankings: IMF country-rank estimates (e.g., Russia as 9th-largest in 2025) depend on forecasting and revisions and may not fully reflect informal economic strains tied to the war.
Bottom line
Four years after the February 2022 invasion, the evidence points to a profound strategic miscalculation by Moscow. A campaign premised on speed and decisive outcomes instead evolved into extended attrition that has inflicted heavy human and material losses, strained Russia’s labor markets and altered its geopolitical options. While energy revenues and adaptive fiscal measures have masked some near-term pain, the deeper structural effects—skewed labor allocation, higher recruitment costs, and diplomatic constriction—are likely to persist.
For policymakers and observers, the immediate question is whether either side can break the current stalemate without triggering escalatory steps that widen the war. The next phase will hinge on industrial sustainment, recruitment pools, external support flows, and political will inside Russia and Ukraine. All are variables that will determine whether the four-year patterns harden into long-term equilibrium or shift toward a decisive change in trajectory.
Sources
- CNN — Major news outlet (original report and on-the-ground reporting)
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) — Think tank (casualty estimates and analysis)
- Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) — Security think tank (operational reconstructions)
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) — International financial institution (GDP ranking and forecasts)
- Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) — Policy research (analysis of Russia–China relationship)
- Nezavisimaya Gazeta — Russian newspaper (reporting on labor shortages and domestic economic strains)