Syria al-Shara al-Baghdadi Trump – The New York Times

Lead

On Monday, Nov. 10, 2025, President Trump will receive Syrian president Ahmed al-Shara at the White House, six years after U.S. commandos killed Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi in the village of Barisha. The meeting follows a rapid political ascent: al-Shara, once Abu Mohammed al‑Jolani and a former associate of al‑Baghdadi, toppled Bashar al‑Assad in December 2024 and has since courted international support. Residents of Barisha—and Syrians across Idlib—express a cautious mixture of relief and anxiety after years of conflict. The encounter foregrounds difficult questions about reconciliation, intelligence partnerships and the durability of a post‑war settlement.

Key Takeaways

• Oct. 27, 2019: U.S. Delta Force raided Barisha, Syria, killing Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi after a 3.5‑hour operation, according to residents who heard helicopters and explosions.
• Nov. 10, 2025: President Trump will host Ahmed al‑Shara—formerly Abu Mohammed al‑Jolani—at the White House following a first meeting in Saudi Arabia in May 2025.
• Dec. 2024: Al‑Shara overthrew Bashar al‑Assad and became Syria’s president, ending a five‑decade authoritarian rule, according to continental reporting.
• Idlib shifts: Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham’s banner remains visible at Idlib’s northern approach; the U.S. removed the group from its terror designation four months before the article date.
• Local impact: Barisha residents report property damage and trauma from the 2019 raid; one resident requested roughly $5,000 in compensation for losses.
• Intelligence links: Western diplomats say al‑Shara likely provided information used against IS and Al Qaeda leaders near Idlib, though direct attribution to Baghdadi’s death is unresolved.
• Political uncertainty: Observers note al‑Shara’s rapid moderation but caution about his authoritarian background and the fragility of political pluralism in Syria.

Background

Barisha, a small village in northwestern Syria, became globally known after a U.S. special operations raid in October 2019 that killed Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi, the Islamic State leader who had presided over large swaths of Syria and Iraq. At the time, many villagers reported being startled by helicopters and explosions; some described finding bodies in the rubble the next morning. The raid was presented by then‑President Trump as a signature counterterrorism success for his administration.

Parallel to that event, a former Iraqi‑era jihadi and later rebel commander, Ahmed al‑Shara—known for years as Abu Mohammed al‑Jolani—began a political evolution. Charged originally to expand Al Qaeda’s presence in Syria, al‑Shara split with al‑Baghdadi around 2013 and, from roughly 2016, pursued a more pragmatic and occasionally conciliatory line. By late 2024 he had seized the momentum to dismantle Assad’s rule and position himself as Syria’s head of state, drawing wary international attention.

Main Event

The Oct. 27, 2019 raid on Barisha lasted about 3.5 hours by residents’ account; helicopters, gunfire and explosions filled the night. Mr. Kaseer, a resident who recalled hearing an American soldier speak in Arabic, said villagers awoke thinking a Syrian regime helicopter had landed. The reported sequence of events included commands for occupants to exit and graphic descriptions by senior U.S. officials of al‑Baghdadi’s death in an underground tunnel where he detonated an explosive vest.

In Idlib city, al‑Shara’s movement erected prominent flags and messages that signaled a shift in local order. The large banner of Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham still greets visitors on the northern highway, although the Syrian flag has not yet reappeared with equal prominence at that entry point. Residents interviewed in both Barisha and Idlib described a sense of relief after years of fighting, even as pockets of violence persist.

Al‑Shara’s pivot from insurgent to head of state included diplomatic outreach. He met President Trump in Saudi Arabia in May 2025 and now travels to Washington, where the White House reception marks the first time a Syrian leader has been afforded that honor in decades. Western diplomats say al‑Shara provided intelligence on extremist cells around Idlib; the extent and impact of that cooperation remain contested among officials.

Locally, the human fallout from the 2019 raid lingers: villagers described destroyed property, trauma and the hope—unfulfilled so far—of compensation. One long‑time Barisha resident asked for roughly $5,000 to cover damage and medical effects he attributes to the trauma of the night raid. These micro‑claims feed into broader questions about accountability, reconstruction and reconciliation in a post‑conflict Syria.

Analysis & Implications

Strategically, the summit between Trump and al‑Shara rewrites several post‑2011 assumptions about Syria. A leader once associated with jihadi networks now sits in Damascus and seeks U.S. validation, suggesting a pragmatic reordering of alliances that privileges stability and counterterrorism cooperation over ideological pedigree. For Washington, formal engagement may yield short‑term tactical gains—access to on‑the‑ground intelligence and a partner to prevent extremist resurgence—but it also risks legitimizing actors with complex violent pasts.

Domestically in Syria, the immediate effect appears to be a reduction in large‑scale combat and a public sense of respite, as residents report a return of routine activities and humor. Yet the institutional architecture needed for durable peace—independent courts, a free press, safeguard for minority rights—is not yet in place. Al‑Shara’s background in hierarchical, command‑driven movements raises concerns that political openings may narrow once security consolidates under his authority.

Regionally, Gulf states and Turkey will watch how U.S. engagement influences their own Syria policies. If Washington anchors al‑Shara into a security framework, it may reduce the incentive for external actors to pursue military options, but it could deepen rivalries if other patrons feel excluded. Economically, reconstruction funding will hinge on perceived legitimacy and guarantees that projects are protected from corruption and factional capture.

Comparison & Data

The table above places key turning points side by side to show how an insurgent pathway evolved into formal statecraft within a decade. These milestones illustrate both the speed of political change in Syria after a protracted civil war and the continuing importance of intelligence and diplomatic recalibration in shaping outcomes.

Reactions & Quotes

“He died like a dog,”

Donald Trump (2019, comment on Baghdadi raid)

Context: Mr. Trump used the phrase in Oct. 2019 to describe al‑Baghdadi’s death and to emphasize counterterrorism success—language that resonated politically in the U.S. at the time.

“It is an amazing turn of events,”

Randa Slim, Foreign Policy Institute

Context: A scholar at Johns Hopkins’ think tank highlighted the paradox of a former associate of al‑Baghdadi now engaging with global leaders, while asking whether a more repressive turn might follow.

“We were in the house next door and we were scared out of our minds!”

Rashid Muhammad Kaseer, Barisha resident

Context: A resident recounted the fear and disruption of the 2019 raid and the village’s lingering search for compensation and recovery.

Unconfirmed

• Whether al‑Shara’s alleged intelligence cooperation directly enabled the 2019 killing of al‑Baghdadi is not independently verified and remains disputed among diplomats.
• The $5,000 compensation figure mentioned by a Barisha resident is his personal request and has not been confirmed by any U.S. government payment or program.
• Claims that al‑Baghdadi used an extensive tunnel complex at the Barisha compound are reported by residents and officials but lack independent archaeological or forensics confirmation in public records.
• The long‑term political orientation of al‑Shara—whether he will entrench plural institutions or consolidate power—is still uncertain and depends on future actions and checks.

Bottom Line

The Trump‑al‑Shara meeting in Washington crystallizes a broader recalibration: actors once on the margins of international diplomacy now command state power and attention. For the United States, engaging Syria’s leader could yield tactical security benefits but will test Washington’s willingness to balance short‑term gains against long‑term governance and human rights concerns.

For Syrians, the immediate relief from active combat is tangible in places such as Barisha and Idlib, yet reconstruction, accountability and institution building remain unfinished. Observers and policymakers should watch whether international engagement fosters inclusive recovery or simply legitimizes a centralized authority with a troubled past.

Sources

• The New York Times (news media; original reporting)
• Reuters (news agency; regional reporting)
• Agence France‑Presse (AFP) (news agency; photo and field reporting)
• Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute (think tank/academic comment; expert commentary from Randa Slim)