Former U.S. Air Force Pilot Arrested for Training Chinese Military Pilots

Lead: On February 26, 2026, former U.S. Air Force officer Gerald Eddie Brown Jr., 65, was arrested in Jeffersonville, Indiana, and charged in a criminal complaint for providing and conspiring to provide defense services to pilots of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Authorities say Brown, an experienced fighter pilot and former F-35 instructor, lacked the State Department export license required to train foreign military personnel, in alleged violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). He is expected to make an initial appearance before a Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of Indiana on February 26, 2026. The filing and public statements characterize the allegations as significant for U.S. national security and consistent with a pattern of foreign targeting of current and former U.S. military personnel.

Key Takeaways

• Gerald Eddie Brown Jr., 65, a U.S. citizen and former U.S. Air Force Major, was arrested in Jeffersonville, Indiana on February 26, 2026, under a criminal complaint alleging AECA violations.
• Prosecutors allege Brown provided and conspired to provide defense services to PLAAF pilots beginning in or around August 2023 and traveled to China in December 2023.
• The conduct is alleged to be export-controlled under ITAR; Brown is accused of lacking the DDTC license required to train foreign military personnel.
• Brown served over 24 years on active duty, leaving in 1996 as a Major, and later worked as a contract simulator instructor for U.S. defense contractors on the A-10 and F-35.
• The complaint links Brown’s arrangements to communications involving Stephen Su Bin, a Chinese national who pleaded guilty in 2016 to hacking U.S. defense contractors and was sanctioned on the U.S. Commerce Entity List.
• Investigators on the case include the FBI New York Field Office with assistance from Louisville, Indianapolis and Los Angeles offices, plus the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.
• The arrest follows prior, similar prosecutions such as the 2017 Duggan case and aligns with allied warnings about PLA efforts to recruit Western military expertise.

Background

Brown’s service record spans more than two decades in the U.S. Air Force, where he flew and instructed on multiple fighter and attack aircraft including the F-4, F-15, F-16, A-10 and later the F-35 Lightning II. He left active duty in 1996 with the rank of Major and later worked in the commercial aviation sector and as a contractor providing simulator instruction to U.S. military pilots. That background is central to the allegations, which emphasize his training in tactics, techniques and procedures deemed sensitive by the U.S. government.

The legal framework at issue includes the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), administered by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). Under these rules, U.S. persons who provide defense services to foreign militaries must generally secure DDTC authorization. Federal prosecutors and national security officials have in recent years focused on preventing transfer of operational knowledge that could enable adversary forces to exploit U.S. tactics or systems.

Main Event

According to the criminal complaint, planning for Brown’s work for the PRC began in or around August 2023, when he purportedly discussed terms through a co-conspirator and exchanged messages with Stephen Su Bin, a Chinese national previously convicted in 2016 of conspiring to hack U.S. defense contractors. Prosecutors allege Brown set his objective as ‘Instructor Fighter Pilot’ when applying for the role and accepted arrangements that would place him in training positions equivalent to U.S. tactical schools.

Brown allegedly traveled to the PRC in December 2023. The complaint states that on his first day he answered three hours of questions about the U.S. Air Force and on his second day he presented a personal briefing to PLAAF personnel. He is accused of remaining in-country until early February 2026, then returning to the United States, where authorities arrested him in Jeffersonville, Indiana on February 26, 2026.

Federal statements emphasize that the training Brown is alleged to have provided qualifies as a defense service under ITAR and required a DDTC license that Brown reportedly did not possess. The complaint frames the conduct as willful and coordinated with foreign nationals and U.S. persons to deliver combat aircraft training to PRC military pilots.

Analysis & Implications

If proved at trial, the allegations would represent a direct transfer of operational military expertise from a U.S.-trained pilot to a foreign adversary. Prosecutors and national security officials portray such transfers as degrading U.S. military advantage by enabling modernization and tactics refinement within the PLA. Enforcement of AECA and ITAR is a primary mechanism for limiting these transfers beyond classifications of information.

The case also illustrates persistent recruitment and exploitation patterns cited by allied warnings issued in June 2024, which flagged PLA efforts to target former NATO and Western military personnel. That multinational advisory and subsequent public statements from senior commanders underscore an ongoing policy emphasis on safeguarding tactics, techniques and procedures even after service members leave active duty.

Legally, the government will need to prove willfulness and the absence of required DDTC authorization for the alleged defense services. The government has summoned investigative resources across several FBI field offices and AFOSI, reflecting both the evidentiary complexity and the cross-jurisdictional elements of overseas conduct, foreign intermediaries and domestic contacts.

Comparison & Data

The table highlights parallels between the Brown and Duggan matters: both involve ex-U.S. military aviators accused of transferring aviation expertise to PRC military pilots, and both attracted multinational investigative attention. While Duggan’s matter included additional allegations of money laundering and carrier-based tactics training, Brown’s complaint centers on simulator and operational training alleged to have occurred in the PRC.

Reactions & Quotes

The Department of Justice and national security offices framed the arrest as an enforcement measure to protect U.S. military advantage and deter exploitation.

He now stands charged with training Chinese military pilots.

John A. Eisenberg, Assistant Attorney General for National Security

This statement was released with the charging documents and underscores the Department’s view that unauthorized training activity by U.S. persons is prosecutable under export control statutes. The FBI highlighted the national security risk and the agency’s commitment to pursue those who engage with adversary militaries.

The Chinese government continues to exploit the expertise of current and former members of the U.S. armed forces.

Roman Rozhavsky, Assistant Director, FBI Counterintelligence and Espionage Division

Air Force investigative authorities also emphasized a breach of oath and institutional trust, framing the alleged conduct as endangering servicemembers and allies. Local U.S. Attorney statements signaled a coordinated prosecutorial effort across jurisdictions.

Unconfirmed

• The complaint alleges training activities and travel; whether Brown provided classified information or specifically criminalized operational tactics remains unproven and will be determined in court.
• The role and identities of any additional co-conspirators beyond the named intermediary and Stephen Su Bin are not fully public and remain under investigation.

Bottom Line

The arrest of Gerald Eddie Brown Jr. signals continued U.S. enforcement against transfers of military expertise to the PRC and reiterates longstanding export-control principles that apply to training and technical assistance. Prosecutors are treating alleged conduct that leverages U.S. military experience for foreign military benefit as an enforcement priority when it occurs without DDTC authorization.

Practically, the case will test evidentiary boundaries for proving willful violation of export controls in cross-border settings and may shape future guidance for veterans, contractors and defense instructors about permissible post-service activities. Watch for charging updates, any indictment or superseding information, and the government’s presentation of evidence at the initial appearance and subsequent proceedings.

Sources

• U.S. Department of Justice — Press Release (Official)