The U.S. men’s national team closed its September camp with clarity: after a 2-0 loss to South Korea and a convincing 2-0 win over Japan, head coach Mauricio Pochettino appears to have found a preferred shape and several players who boosted their World Cup stock. The camp featured deliberate experimentation with personnel and systems, a midgame formation switch that altered both matches, and clear implications for the 2026 roster race. Results and underlying metrics — including a post‑half surge in control and an xG swing — make this window feel like a turning point.
Key Takeaways
- The US lost 2-0 to South Korea, then beat Japan 2-0; the two results framed an experimental camp under Mauricio Pochettino.
- Pochettino’s 4-3-2-1 experiment versus South Korea struggled; a switch to 3-4-2-1 around the hour mark changed momentum and outcomes.
- From halftime of the South Korea game onward the US outshot opponents 36-12, and combined xG from that stretch favored the US 4.02–1.33.
- Folarin Balogun played roughly 120 minutes across the window, scored against Japan and pushed himself to the top of the No. 9 pecking order despite earlier misses.
- Austin Arfsten rose sharply in profile, excelling as a wingback in the 3-4-2-1 and earning unsolicited praise from Pochettino.
- Zack Freese showed improved decisiveness as a sweeper‑keeper; Luis Zendejas provided a timely opener against Japan.
- Christian Pulisic, Tyler Adams and Sergiño Dest had mixed moments in the 4-3-2-1, revealing role and pressing questions.
- Center-back depth and aerial competence remain concerns if the US persist with a back three; options like Walker Zimmerman or Miles Robinson were flagged as possibilities.
Background
Pochettino arrived with an explicit license to experiment this year, testing both personnel and systems as he assesses a large pool ahead of the 2026 World Cup on home soil. With the tournament 274 days away, each camp is compressed and consequential; the coaching staff must balance short-term results with long-term roster building. Historically the U.S. has cycled through formations and personnel rapidly in friendly windows, but the federation and fans crave a coherent identity rather than perpetual tinkering.
The September window brought that tension into focus: Pochettino tried a 4-3-2-1 shape to begin, then shifted into a 3-4-2-1 after a poor first hour versus South Korea. Those moves were more than schematic — they were diagnostic, revealing which players fit which roles and which tactical baseline might best suit the group moving forward. The matches also exposed depth questions at center back and at the traditional No. 9 slot, while elevating some fringe names into serious contention.
Main Event
The first match, against South Korea, began in a 4-3-2-1 that produced confusion on pressing triggers and defensive responsibilities. The Americans were passive at critical moments — most notably on South Korea’s opener — and defensive lapses, including a failure to step for an offside play, proved costly. The shape left the attack sporadic and the defense vulnerable on the counter.
Pochettino responded at roughly the hour mark by introducing personnel changes and moving to a 3-4-2-1. That adjustment immediately tilted the game: the U.S. outshot South Korea by a wide margin in the remaining minutes and created far better sustained attacking sequences. The same 3-4-2-1 was the starting framework in the Japan match, where the U.S. produced its cleanest and most controlled performance under Pochettino, winning 2-0.
Folarin Balogun endured a campaign of near misses across both matches but converted against Japan, using physicality and composure in the box to score and to quiet some critics. Zendejas opened the scoring in the Japan game with a decisive moment after a steady 30‑minute outing against South Korea. Several substitutes, notably Ethan McGlynn, made late impacts, reinforcing the value of attacking options off the bench.
Analysis & Implications
The tactical takeaway is simple: the 3-4-2-1 unlocked more control, better chance creation and clearer roles for wingbacks and the No. 9. If Pochettino keeps this structure, the U.S. will prioritize athletic wingbacks who can both defend and provide width, a central striker who can hold and finish inside the box, and midfielders who offer both ball-winning and connective passing. That profile elevated Arfsten, Roldan and Balogun during the window.
Roster implications are significant. Balogun’s goal and overall link-up with teammates give him the strongest claim to the starting striker role; his club form with Monaco compounds that momentum. By contrast, Josh Sargent’s international goalscoring record (five goals in 29 caps, none since 2019) and tepid chance conversion suggest he’s slipping from immediate contention unless a midseason club surge occurs.
Center-back depth remains an unresolved issue if the US commits to a back three. The combination of Tristan Blackmon, Tim Ream and Chris Richards raised concerns about aerial dominance and physicality; Pochettino explicitly hinted that experimentation at the position is finished, but he may still explore the inclusion of bigger, more aerially dominant defenders such as Walker Zimmerman or Miles Robinson for balance.
Comparison & Data
| Period/Match | Result | Shots (US–Opp) | xG | Minutes in 3-4-2-1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post‑halftime (SK onward) | — | 36–12 | 4.02–1.33 | ~120 of 135 minutes |
| South Korea | 0–2 loss | — | — | ~30–45 after switch |
| Japan | 2–0 win | — | — | Majority of match |
Those numbers underline the camp’s narrative: the team was markedly better once Pochettino found a shape that organized pressing and transitions more effectively. The xG advantage and shot differentials are consistent with a side that controlled the ball and generated higher‑quality chances after the tactical change.
Reactions & Quotes
On the player who stood out as a tactical fit, Pochettino singled out a young wingback’s attitude and intelligence when reflecting on the Japan performance.
“It’s a player that we really believe from day one… he’s a very intelligent, very smart guy.”
Mauricio Pochettino — postgame press remarks
After Zendejas’s goal, Pochettino emphasized how a single performance can change selection debates heading into larger camps.
“We are so pleased because he, with his performance, makes us doubt about [our roster choices]… he’s in the race for the roster for the World Cup.”
Mauricio Pochettino — postgame press remarks
Observers and analysts noted a clear split between the phase when Balogun played and when he did not, arguing his minutes — even with missed chances — made the biggest practical difference for the team’s attack.
Unconfirmed
- Reports about the precise personal or off-field reasons why Gio Reyna and Joe Scally were absent remain speculative and unverified in official channels.
- Any suggestion that Pochettino has definitively closed the door on certain Euro‑based players for 2026 should be treated as provisional until formal roster announcements are released.
Bottom Line
September’s window operated as a focused experiment that appears to have produced a preferred tactical baseline — the 3-4-2-1 — and a clearer pecking order at key positions. Folarin Balogun, Austin Arfsten and a handful of others emerged by combining club form with role clarity; others, notably Josh Sargent and a few defensive options, saw their immediate standing decline or remain uncertain.
With the World Cup 274 days away, the U.S. must convert experimentation into a consistent identity. If Pochettino sticks with the 3-4-2-1, roster decisions will hinge on wingback athleticism, central defensive size and a No. 9 who finishes chances. The next camps and club seasons will determine whether the September window was an inflection point or merely a promising interlude.