{"id":11338,"date":"2025-12-25T16:06:52","date_gmt":"2025-12-25T16:06:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/ukraine-dmz-donbas-zaporizhzhia\/"},"modified":"2025-12-25T16:06:52","modified_gmt":"2025-12-25T16:06:52","slug":"ukraine-dmz-donbas-zaporizhzhia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/ukraine-dmz-donbas-zaporizhzhia\/","title":{"rendered":"Ukraine offers DMZs in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia as part of 20-point peace plan"},"content":{"rendered":"<article>\n<p>Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 25 December 2025 that Kyiv is prepared to convert the parts of the Donbas it still controls into a demilitarised zone (DMZ) if Russia likewise keeps its forces out. The proposal, presented as part of a US-backed 20-point peace plan, also includes a DMZ proposal around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, currently under Russian control. Zelenskyy framed the move as a major concession intended to push diplomatic pressure onto Moscow while resisting demands to constitutionally renounce NATO membership. The announcement comes amid continued Russian battlefield gains and diplomatic pressure from the United States and US President Donald Trump to reach a ceasefire.<\/p>\n<h2>Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>On 25 December 2025, Zelenskyy unveiled a 20-point peace plan developed by negotiators from Washington and Kyiv; he read it in a two-hour briefing to journalists.<\/li>\n<li>The plan proposes converting Ukrainian-held areas of Donbas into a DMZ provided Russia withdraws or keeps its troops out; Russia currently controls almost all of Luhansk and about 70% of Donetsk.<\/li>\n<li>A second proposed DMZ would surround the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Europe\u2019s largest nuclear station, which is under Russian control.<\/li>\n<li>Zelenskyy said any Ukrainian troop withdrawals or territorial concessions would require a national referendum; Ukraine\u2019s constitution limits unilateral border changes by the government.<\/li>\n<li>The plan is described by Kyiv as backed by US negotiators; Moscow has said it is &#8220;formulating its position&#8221; and has not accepted or rejected the plan.<\/li>\n<li>Historical DMZs\u2014Korea (1953), Golan Heights (1974, UNDOF), Sinai (1979) and \u00c5land (1921)\u2014show varied success, depending on enforcement mechanisms and political context.<\/li>\n<li>Major open questions include who would monitor compliance, how nuclear and energy infrastructure would be managed, and what enforcement guarantees would exist.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Background<\/h2>\n<p>Since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion in 2022, the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia regions have been focal points of intense military contestation and political negotiations. Donetsk and Luhansk\u2014the industrial core known as the Donbas\u2014have seen shifting front lines; Russian forces hold almost all of Luhansk and roughly 70% of Donetsk as of late 2025. Zaporizhzhia hosts Europe\u2019s largest nuclear plant, which Kyiv has sought to secure but which has remained under Russian control, raising persistent safety concerns.<\/p>\n<p>Diplomatic efforts to end the war have involved multiple actors, notably the United States. According to Zelenskyy, this 20-point plan emerged from talks between Kyiv and Washington in Florida over a single weekend and was publicly presented as having US backing. At the same time, the Trump administration has pushed for a ceasefire and for Ukraine to hold elections\u2014moves that Kyiv has resisted making unconditional or immediate without a formal peace settlement.<\/p>\n<h2>Main Event<\/h2>\n<p>In his briefing, Zelenskyy proposed that Ukrainian-held pockets of Donbas be converted into demilitarised or &#8220;free economic&#8221; zones provided Russia commits to refraining from deploying troops there. He described the format as one that could potentially satisfy both sides while reserving Ukraine\u2019s constitutional requirement that border changes be validated by a referendum. The Ukrainian president also proposed a DMZ around Zaporizhzhia, citing the plant\u2019s strategic and humanitarian importance.<\/p>\n<p>Details about governance, oversight and resource sharing in the suggested DMZs were thin in the presentation. Zelenskyy and his team described the proposals as part of a compromise aimed at removing immediate battlefield pressures while leaving final status questions\u2014such as sovereignty and constitutional changes\u2014to formal processes, including a referendum. Kyiv explicitly resisted earlier suggestions to enshrine neutrality or a ban on NATO membership in the constitution, saying such a move would be the prerogative of NATO members.<\/p>\n<p>Moscow\u2019s immediate reaction was limited. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia was &#8220;formulating its position&#8221; and did not accept or reject the plan at the time of the announcement. Western and Ukrainian officials framed Kyiv\u2019s DMZ proposal as a tactical shift to signal readiness for negotiated cessation of hostilities and to place the diplomatic onus on Russia to reciprocate.<\/p>\n<h2>Analysis &#038; Implications<\/h2>\n<p>Demilitarised zones can provide breathing space and reduce the likelihood of large-scale clashes when paired with robust monitoring, clear rules of engagement and impartial guarantors. The Korean DMZ is an extreme example: a heavily fortified buffer that has largely prevented full-scale wars between North and South Korea since 1953, backed by strict armistice terms and sustained international attention. However, the Korean example also shows that a DMZ does not erase political antagonism or lower-level violence.<\/p>\n<p>In contrast, UN-monitored DMZs such as the Golan Heights and Sinai have depended on effective peacekeeping mandates and the political will of guarantor states. Where enforcement is weak or one party sees an advantage in violating the zone\u2014as critics say has happened in parts of the Golan\u2014DMZs can become porous and contested, with periodic incursions and political manipulation. The Aland Islands and the Antarctic Treaty show demilitarisation working where parties accept clear legal frameworks and third-party guarantees.<\/p>\n<p>For Ukraine, the practical obstacles are large. Kyiv\u2019s proposal requires Russia to pull back from areas it currently occupies or to pledge not to advance into zones it claims. Given Russia\u2019s battlefield gains in Luhansk and Donetsk, and its control of Zaporizhzhia NPP, Moscow has limited incentive to withdraw without enforceable guarantees. Any effective DMZ arrangement would therefore need credible, preferably international, monitoring and a dispute-resolution mechanism\u2014both politically difficult to secure while active hostilities continue.<\/p>\n<p>Economically and politically, designating DMZs as &#8220;free trade&#8221; or economic zones introduces further complexity. Management of energy infrastructure, property claims and the rights of civilians inside proposed zones would require detailed legal and administrative frameworks. These questions\u2014over governance, revenue sharing and evacuation or return of civilians\u2014would likely be as contentious as front-line troop movements.<\/p>\n<h2>Comparison &#038; Data<\/h2>\n<figure>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>DMZ<\/th>\n<th>Established<\/th>\n<th>Key feature<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Korean DMZ<\/td>\n<td>1953<\/td>\n<td>4 km-wide buffer; armistice-backed, heavily fortified<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Golan Heights (UNDOF zone)<\/td>\n<td>1974<\/td>\n<td>UN peacekeepers separate Syrian and Israeli forces<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Sinai security zones<\/td>\n<td>1979<\/td>\n<td>Multinational Force and Observers monitor staged military limits<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>\u00c5land Islands<\/td>\n<td>1921<\/td>\n<td>Demilitarised by international decision, autonomous governance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Antarctica<\/td>\n<td>1959<\/td>\n<td>Comprehensive demilitarisation under treaty<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<p>Past cases indicate that DMZ durability correlates with the clarity of legal arrangements, the neutrality and capacity of monitors, and the strategic calculus of the parties involved. Where one side perceives tactical or territorial advantage, violations are more likely; where international guarantees exist and parties accept legal constraints, demilitarisation endures.<\/p>\n<h2>Reactions &#038; Quotes<\/h2>\n<p>Ukrainian officials framed the DMZ proposals as a serious offer to halt hostilities while preserving Ukraine\u2019s long-term political choices. International analysts cautioned that enforcement would be the decisive issue.<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>&#8220;We are looking at a format that could satisfy both sides, but the key question is how it will function on the ground.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>Marina Miron, King\u2019s College London (academic analyst)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Miron\u2019s assessment, cited in media coverage, underscores skepticism about Russia withdrawing from territories it currently holds without strong enforcement mechanisms. She characterized Kyiv\u2019s move as shifting diplomatic burden onto Moscow.<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>&#8220;Russia is formulating its position on the proposed plan,&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesman (official)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The Kremlin\u2019s cautious response left the plan\u2019s fate uncertain; Moscow did not formally accept or reject the proposals at the time of Zelenskyy\u2019s announcement.<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>&#8220;It is the choice of NATO members whether to have Ukraine or not&#8230; Our choice has been made.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine (official)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Zelenskyy reiterated that Ukraine would not unilaterally cede its right to seek alliance membership, and he stressed that territorial changes would require a national referendum.<\/p>\n<aside>\n<details>\n<summary>Explainer: What is a demilitarised zone (DMZ)?<\/summary>\n<p>A demilitarised zone is an area where military forces, fortifications and certain weapons systems are prohibited by agreement among parties or under international law. DMZs can be temporary buffers created by armistice terms or permanent arrangements codified in treaties. Their effectiveness typically depends on clear legal definitions, rules for civilian activity, impartial monitoring (often by the UN or third-party forces) and mechanisms to resolve violations. In contested conflicts, DMZs that lack enforcement or mutual trust can become zones of low-intensity violence rather than durable peace.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/aside>\n<h2>Unconfirmed<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Whether Moscow will accept the specific DMZ proposals and withdraw Russian forces from areas it currently occupies is not confirmed.<\/li>\n<li>Who would serve as an impartial monitor or guarantor for any DMZ arrangement\u2014UN forces, a multinational force, or bilateral monitors\u2014remains undecided and unconfirmed.<\/li>\n<li>The operational details for managing Zaporizhzhia NPP under a DMZ\u2014staffing, inspections and emergency response protocols\u2014have not been agreed and are currently unconfirmed.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Bottom Line<\/h2>\n<p>Zelenskyy\u2019s offer to convert Ukrainian-held Donbas territory and areas around Zaporizhzhia into demilitarised zones represents Kyiv\u2019s most significant territorial concession to date and a tactical attempt to shift diplomatic pressure onto Russia. The proposal signals willingness to compromise on front-line dispositions while keeping ultimate sovereignty questions, such as NATO membership and border changes, subject to Ukrainian constitutional and popular approval.<\/p>\n<p>Whether the DMZ idea can translate into a durable de-escalation depends on three hard realities: Moscow\u2019s willingness to withdraw or refrain from operations, credible independent monitoring and enforcement, and practical arrangements for civilian governance and critical infrastructure. Without those elements, historical comparisons suggest DMZs risk becoming contested buffers rather than foundations for lasting peace.<\/p>\n<h2>Sources<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2025\/12\/25\/ukraine-accepts-demilitarised-zone-to-end-russia-war-but-do-dmzs-work\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Al Jazeera (news report)<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.kremlin.ru\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Kremlin (official statements)<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.kcl.ac.uk\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">King\u2019s College London (academic institution)<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/article>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 25 December 2025 that Kyiv is prepared to convert the parts of the Donbas it still controls into a demilitarised zone (DMZ) if Russia likewise keeps its forces out. The proposal, presented as part of a US-backed 20-point peace plan, also includes a DMZ proposal around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear &#8230; <a title=\"Ukraine offers DMZs in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia as part of 20-point peace plan\" class=\"read-more\" href=\"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/ukraine-dmz-donbas-zaporizhzhia\/\" aria-label=\"Read more about Ukraine offers DMZs in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia as part of 20-point peace plan\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":11333,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"rank_math_title":"Ukraine offers DMZs in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia | DeepBrief","rank_math_description":"On 25 Dec 2025 Zelenskyy proposed converting Ukrainian-held Donbas and Zaporizhzhia zones into DMZs under a US-backed 20-point plan. We examine whether such zones can be enforced.","rank_math_focus_keyword":"Ukraine, demilitarised zone, Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, peace plan","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11338","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-top-stories"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11338","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11338"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11338\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/11333"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11338"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11338"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/readtrends.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11338"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}