Lead: As of 26 May 2026, health authorities report an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus affecting eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda. The DRC Ministry of Health reported on 25 May a total of 105 confirmed cases (including 10 confirmed deaths) and 906 suspected cases (including 223 suspected deaths) across Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. Uganda has reported seven confirmed cases, including one death, with several infections linked to travel from the DRC. Two travellers from Uganda who were tested in Lombardy, Italy on 25 May were isolated in Milan but laboratory testing subsequently ruled out Ebola.
Key takeaways
- As of 25 May 2026 the DRC Ministry of Health reported 105 confirmed cases and 10 confirmed deaths in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.
- The DRC also reported 906 suspected cases, among which 223 deaths were recorded, per the 25 May update.
- Uganda has reported seven confirmed cases and one death; several Ugandan cases are epidemiologically linked to travel from the DRC.
- On 25 May two travellers from Uganda were hospitalised in isolation in Milan, Italy; laboratory testing later excluded Ebola infection.
- The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) assesses the likelihood of infection for people living in the EU/EEA as very low but continues active monitoring.
- ECDC is publishing ongoing assessments in its weekly communicable disease threats report and will revise guidance as new data arrive.
Background
Bundibugyo virus is one of several species of ebolaviruses that can cause severe viral haemorrhagic fever. While large outbreaks in the past have been caused primarily by Zaire ebolavirus, Bundibugyo has triggered regional outbreaks in Africa and is associated with variable case-fatality ratios in prior events. Eastern DRC has experienced repeated outbreaks and protracted public-health challenges due to conflict, population displacement and limited health infrastructure, which complicate detection, contact tracing and care delivery.
Cross-border movement between eastern DRC and neighbouring Uganda is frequent for trade, family ties and humanitarian travel, creating pathways for exportation of cases if chains of transmission are not rapidly contained. National ministries of health, local clinics and international partners typically activate surveillance, isolation, and laboratory testing protocols when haemorrhagic fever is suspected. In this event the DRC Ministry of Health provided the primary case counts cited in ECDC’s 26 May 2026 assessment.
Main event
On 25 May 2026 the DRC Ministry of Health reported consolidated totals for provinces Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu: 105 laboratory-confirmed cases with 10 confirmed deaths, and 906 suspected cases with 223 suspected deaths. Those numbers reflect cases under investigation as well as laboratory confirmation where available; health authorities continue field investigations and sample testing. Uganda’s health authorities reported seven confirmed cases (one fatality), and several of the confirmed Ugandan infections have epidemiological links to recent travel from eastern DRC.
Also on 25 May two people travelling from Uganda to Lombardy, Italy developed symptoms consistent with viral haemorrhagic fever and were admitted to hospital in isolation in Milan. Italian health authorities performed laboratory testing and subsequently ruled out Ebola infection for both individuals. Local containment measures—patient isolation and contact tracing at the point of entry—were applied while test results were pending.
ECDC published an assessment on 26 May 2026 that synthesised these national reports, maintaining that the likelihood of infection for residents of the EU/EEA remains very low. The agency said it will continue to monitor the outbreak and update risk assessments in its weekly communicable disease threats report as new surveillance and laboratory data become available.
Analysis & implications
The immediate public-health implication is heightened pressure on surveillance, laboratory capacity and clinical isolation in eastern DRC and border districts in Uganda. High numbers of suspected cases (906 reported in DRC) indicate active investigation and diagnostic backlog; suspected-case counts often include febrile illnesses that mimic haemorrhagic fever, so laboratory confirmation is essential to define the outbreak’s true scope. Local health systems—already strained by insecurity and limited resources—face logistical hurdles for timely sample transport, personal protective equipment, and safe patient management.
Cross-border transmission risk to neighbouring countries is a practical concern because of trade and population movement; Uganda’s seven confirmed cases tied to travel underscore that dynamic. For the EU/EEA, ECDC judges population-level risk to be very low because of routine entry screening practices, rapid isolation protocols, and low travel volumes from the specific affected areas. Nevertheless, single imported cases are possible and require immediate public-health response to prevent onward transmission.
Therapeutics and vaccines are part of preparedness planning, but their utility depends on virus species and vaccine licensure. Vaccines and monoclonal antibody treatments developed for Zaire ebolavirus may have limited or unproven cross-protection against Bundibugyo virus; therefore regionally tailored clinical protocols and laboratory confirmation remain central. International partners will likely prioritise diagnostics, protective equipment and surge support rather than large-scale vaccine deployment unless species-specific data change.
Comparison & data
| Location | Confirmed cases | Confirmed deaths | Suspected cases | Suspected deaths | Date (source) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DRC (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu) | 105 | 10 | 906 | 223 | 25 May 2026 |
| Uganda | 7 | 1 | — | — | 25 May 2026 |
| Italy (Lombardy, suspected) | 0 confirmed (2 suspected ruled out) | 0 | 2 (ruled out) | 0 | 25 May 2026 |
The table summarises the figures reported to ECDC as of the late-May update. Confirmed-case counts reflect laboratory-confirmed infections; suspected-case counts often reflect clinically compatible illness pending confirmation. Differences in surveillance intensity, laboratory access and case definitions across countries can affect comparability of suspected-case totals and the speed of confirmation.
Reactions & quotes
Public-health bodies and national ministries have emphasised surveillance and laboratory confirmation as priorities while urging calm. ECDC summarised its assessment and next steps.
“We assess the likelihood of infection for people living in the EU/EEA to be very low,”
ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, EU agency)
ECDC’s statement frames the near-term risk for EU/EEA residents as low but signals continued monitoring and readiness to update guidance if the situation evolves.
“We have recorded 105 confirmed cases and are investigating 906 suspected cases in three provinces,”
Ministry of Health, DRC (official report cited by ECDC)
The DRC Ministry of Health figures provide the outbreak’s most detailed on-the-ground counts; ministries in affected areas coordinate case detection, safe patient care and community engagement despite operational challenges.
“Laboratory testing in Milan ruled out Ebola for the two travellers,”
Italian health authorities (regional public-health response)
Italian authorities applied isolation and testing protocols at hospital entry, illustrating standard procedures in EU countries for suspected haemorrhagic-fever cases and the role of timely laboratory results in guiding public-health actions.
Unconfirmed
- Whether all suspected cases reported in the DRC are related to the current Bundibugyo outbreak remains unconfirmed pending laboratory results for many samples.
- The extent to which existing Ebola vaccines or therapeutics provide protection against Bundibugyo virus is not fully established and requires species-specific data.
- Potential underreporting in remote or conflict-affected areas could mean case counts underestimate the true burden; the scale of any underascertainment is currently unknown.
Bottom line
The outbreak reported in eastern DRC and Uganda involves confirmed infections with Bundibugyo virus and a large number of suspected cases under investigation. Immediate priorities are laboratory confirmation, isolation of confirmed cases, contact tracing and support for local health systems facing logistical and security constraints. For EU/EEA residents, ECDC’s current assessment categorises population-level risk as very low, but public-health authorities should maintain vigilance at points of entry and ensure rapid diagnostic pathways are ready.
Expect evolving updates: confirmed counts may change as more laboratory results arrive, and international partners will likely focus on diagnostics, clinical support and community engagement rather than broad travel restrictions. Readers in affected or neighbouring regions should follow local health authority guidance; clinicians anywhere should apply standard infection prevention and testing protocols for suspected haemorrhagic-fever cases.