Lead
As geopolitical rivalries intensify, established rules that governed the post-1945 era are fraying and middle-power states face a new strategic test. Over recent weeks at Davos and in public remarks by US officials, actions and words from Washington signalled a tilt toward unconstrained great-power behaviour. That shift revives older patterns—from the Monroe Doctrine to Cold War interventions—and forces countries between superpowers to choose whether to band together or be squeezed. The immediate consequence is rising diplomatic strain and an urgent question about how middle powers will preserve autonomy and the rules that supported global stability for eight decades.
Key Takeaways
- Allan Little recounts a 2002 Columbia lecture and 1989 Prague scenes to frame how the US-led, rules-based order shaped the post-1945 world and why its unraveling matters to many states.
- At the World Economic Forum in Davos, former central banker Mark Carney called on “middle powers” to act together, warning that without coordination they risk becoming targets rather than participants.
- Recent US signalling—public rhetoric about Greenland, comments about NATO roles in Afghanistan and a December National Security Strategy—reflect a willingness to privilege unilateral leverage over multilateral restraint.
- Historic US interventions (Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, Grenada 1983, Panama 1989) are cited as precedents showing long-standing patterns of great-power intervention in weaker states.
- European NATO members have responded to pressure by agreeing to raise defence expenditures from roughly 2% of GDP toward a reported 5% target, indicating a major shift in burden-sharing.
- Scholars warn that a return to great-power competition increases risks of destabilising rivalry and reduces predictability for middle powers and the Global South.
- Public trust erosion—driven by economic stagnation, inequality, social media and AI—limits democratic resilience and complicates coalition-building among like-minded middle powers.
Background
The international architecture built after World War Two combined American military power with institutions and rules designed to reduce the resort to force and to stabilise great-power relations. US military victories in Europe, the Marshall Plan’s economic reconstruction and NATO’s security guarantees underpinned decades of relative stability. For many in Western Europe and parts of the Global North, that system delivered growing prosperity and predictable diplomacy.
But that rules-based order was never experienced uniformly. Voices from the Global South have long argued the order was applied unevenly—enforced when convenient and evaded by the strong. Historical episodes—US-supported covert action in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), and later military interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989)—are cited as evidence that power often trumped principle.
From 1815 through the 19th century the Monroe Doctrine and later US policymaking set a tone for hemispheric influence that critics say evolved into a licence for unilateral action. Contemporary policy shifts—articulated in recent US strategy documents and high-profile presidential rhetoric—appear to many analysts as a reinterpretation of those longstanding prerogatives, raising alarms among allies and middle powers.
Main Event
At Davos this month, speeches and exchanges crystallised a sense of rupture. Mark Carney (the former central banker) urged middle powers to coordinate, famously warning, “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.” The comment captured anxiety that, in a less rules-bound system, smaller states will have fewer options and less protection.
President Donald Trump’s recent public comments intensified those concerns. His remarks about Greenland and about NATO contributions during the Afghanistan war provoked sharp reactions in London and other capitals. UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer called certain remarks “insulting and frankly appalling,” prompting direct bilateral engagements and public exchanges between leaders.
Washington’s December National Security Strategy (published in December) signals an America-First approach that foregrounds the use of economic sanctions, tariffs and military options to pursue national interests. Analysts interpret the strategy as prioritising leverage over multilateral constraint and see it as reinforcing a great-power style of diplomacy with less institutional mediation.
European governments reacted unevenly but materially: under pressure, many pledged to boost defence spending markedly from around 2% of GDP toward higher levels — a policy reversal that would have been politically difficult just months earlier. The Greenland episode, in particular, is credited with accelerating allied cohesion and a newfound refusal in some capitals to acquiesce quickly to US pressure.
Analysis & Implications
The retreat from a rules-oriented architecture would have several practical effects. First, middle powers will find diplomatic space narrower: they may be forced to pick sides more openly or face coercive measures like tariffs, sanctions, or military pressure. That reduces the strategic autonomy that many medium-sized democracies have enjoyed by balancing between blocs.
Second, the precedent of selective rule enforcement undermines legal and normative instruments—trade dispute mechanisms, international courts, arms-control frameworks—that depend on reciprocity and predictable behaviour. If great powers choose outcomes over process, dispute resolution mechanisms lose authority and weaker parties have fewer remedies.
Third, an environment shaped by greater unpredictability raises the risk of miscalculation. As historian Jay Sexton notes, 19th-century-style great-power rivalry is destabilising; the more volatile the leading power’s behavior, the harder it is for secondary states to plan secure long-term strategies. That increases the likelihood of crises becoming regional or even global confrontations.
Fourth, the political economy at home matters. Economic stagnation and inequality erode trust in democratic institutions and make publics more receptive to populist leaders who promise decisive action. That dynamic can push middle-power governments toward transactional or security-first policies, undermining long-term cooperative solutions.
Comparison & Data
| Year/Case | US Action | Region |
|---|---|---|
| 1953 | CIA-backed coup removing Prime Minister Mossadeq | Iran |
| 1954 | US-orchestrated coup ousting President Jacobo Arbenz | Guatemala |
| 1983 | Invasion following a Marxist coup | Grenada |
| 1989 | Invasion and arrest of Manuel Noriega | Panama |
These episodes illustrate a historical continuity: over decades, US policy combined strategic interests with interventions in the Americas and beyond. By contrast, post-1945 multilateral institutions sought to restrain the use of force; data on NATO defence spending show a recent uptick from a multiyear average near 2% of GDP toward higher commitments, with some governments publicly targeting levels nearer 5% in response to pressure.
Reactions & Quotes
Allied leaders and commentators reacted strongly to recent US remarks and policy documents. Below are representative statements and their context.
Before quoting, commentators in London flagged a political backlash to remarks perceived as dismissive of allied contributions in Afghanistan.
“Insulting and frankly appalling.”
Sir Keir Starmer, UK Prime Minister
Starmer’s response followed comments about NATO troop roles in Afghanistan and fed domestic pressure to push back diplomatically. In turn, the US president publicly praised UK troops days later, illustrating rapid oscillation between confrontation and conciliatory messaging.
Analysts at international think tanks stress historical continuity in US behaviour toward weaker states while warning that allies are newly feeling that pressure.
“There are long-standing patterns of intervention in Latin America that predate the post-war order,”
Dr Christopher Sabatini, Senior Research Fellow, Chatham House
Sabatini referenced the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine and Cold War precedents to argue that current US tendencies are part of a continuum rather than a wholly new phenomenon.
Unconfirmed
- Reports that Europe will permanently settle on a 5% of GDP defence spending target remain provisional; announcements are at different stages in different capitals and specific timelines vary.
- Claims that the December National Security Strategy will be implemented unchanged depend on future administrations and domestic political dynamics; policy statements may be revised.
- Attributions of motive—such as labeling all recent US actions as a deliberate reversion to 19th-century doctrine—are interpretive and debated among scholars.
Bottom Line
The recent rhetoric and policy signals from Washington, coupled with historical precedents, indicate a shift toward greater great-power assertiveness that constrains middle powers. Those countries now face a choice: invest more in independent defence and deterrence, seek deeper alliances with like-minded states, or accommodate pressure and accept diminished autonomy.
Coordination among middle powers offers a plausible path to preserve the benefits of the post-1945 system without relying exclusively on one hegemon. Yet success depends on domestic political cohesion, capable institutions and sustained investment—political and financial—over years, not months. The coming period will test whether the rules-based order can be adapted to withstand renewed great-power rivalry or whether a more fragmented, competitive international system will become the norm.