— The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia has unsealed a seizure warrant for the crude oil tanker M/T Skipper (IMO 9304667), after the U.S. Coast Guard boarded and seized the vessel on December 10 while it was at sea following departure from Venezuela. The warrant was signed by a D.C. magistrate judge on November 26, 2025. U.S. officials, citing prior designations by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), say the tanker was part of an oil-routing network that benefitted Hizballah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF), both designated foreign terrorist organizations. Federal prosecutors say the seizure was executed by the Coast Guard with Homeland Security Investigations and FBI support and will be prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in D.C. alongside the Justice Department’s National Security and Criminal Divisions.
Key Takeaways
- The seizure warrant for M/T Skipper (IMO 9304667) was signed on November 26, 2025, and unsealed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia.
- The U.S. Coast Guard boarded and seized the vessel on December 10, 2025, while it was transiting on the high seas after leaving Venezuela.
- OFAC previously identified the vessel, formerly named Adisa, as linked to an oil shipping network supporting Hizballah and IRGC-QF, both State-designated terrorist organizations.
- The legal authority cited includes 18 U.S.C. sections 981, 982, 2332b(g)(5), and 2339B(a)(1), statutes permitting seizure of assets tied to terrorism and related crimes.
- Law-enforcement agencies involved included the U.S. Coast Guard, Homeland Security Investigations, and the FBI, with prosecution by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C. and DOJ national security teams.
- Officials framed the action as part of broader sanctions enforcement aimed at restricting revenue streams to Iran-affiliated and Hizballah-linked networks.
Background
Sanctions and maritime interdictions have become a persistent tool in U.S. national security policy to disrupt revenue channels for groups designated as terrorist organizations. OFAC designations have in recent years targeted shipping networks, ship managers, and brokerages alleged to facilitate illicit oil transfers, ship-to-ship transfers, or deceptive flagging. The M/T Skipper, identified by IMO number 9304667 and formerly known as Adisa, appears in OFAC materials as part of such a network, which U.S. officials say moved petroleum proceeds that ultimately supported IRGC-QF and Hizballah activities.
Enforcement at sea involves coordination across military, law-enforcement, and prosecutorial lines: the Coast Guard typically conducts boardings and physical custody actions, while Homeland Security Investigations and the FBI support evidence collection and criminal investigations. Prosecutions of seized vessels cite statutes aimed at forfeiting property used to facilitate terrorism or derived from criminal activity. Historically, maritime seizures tied to sanctions have required careful legal groundwork to meet probable cause standards, secure warrants, and preserve evidence aboard mobile assets at sea.
Main Event
The seizure traceable in court records began with a warrant signed on November 26, 2025, after a multiagency inquiry into the vessel’s operations and affiliations. On December 10, the Coast Guard executed a boarding and took control of the M/T Skipper while it was operating on international waters after departing Venezuela. Agency statements say the boarding and custody transfer were carried out without reported injuries and with standard law-enforcement protocols for shipboard operations.
According to the unsealed warrant and agency announcements, investigators relied on OFAC’s prior designation information showing the vessel’s links to an oil shipping network that allegedly supported Hizballah and IRGC-QF. Law-enforcement sources describe the operation as the product of maritime tracking, financial analysis, and interagency coordination to establish both operational control and a legal predicate for seizure under federal forfeiture and counterterrorism statutes.
Federal officials named in the public announcement included U.S. Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro and FBI Director Kash Patel, each highlighting sanctions enforcement and the multiagency approach. Prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia will lead the criminal forfeiture or related proceedings with assistance from the Justice Department’s National Security Division and Criminal Division.
Analysis & Implications
The seizure underscores how the U.S. government increasingly treats maritime logistics as part of the financial and operational infrastructure of designated foreign terrorist organizations. Cutting access to petroleum revenues is intended to reduce funding available to groups like IRGC-QF and Hizballah, which U.S. authorities say use such proceeds for regional proxy and terrorist activities. The legal framework cited—combining forfeiture statutes and terrorism-specific provisions—signals prosecutors will pursue both asset forfeiture and potentially criminal charges tied to facilitation of terrorism financing.
Diplomatically, the operation could heighten tensions with states perceived as enabling or tolerating shipments that undermine sanctions, notably Venezuela and Iran. U.S. statements framed the action as imposing costs on those governments’ ability to monetize oil via clandestine supply chains. Expect increased scrutiny of vessel ownership, flagging, and ship-management networks—areas where sanctions evasion commonly occurs through shell companies and nominee owners.
Operationally, the case exemplifies whole-of-government enforcement: financial regulators (OFAC) identify targets, maritime forces execute seizures, and prosecutors build cases for court forfeiture. For the maritime industry, the action raises compliance stakes for insurers, charterers, and service providers who may now face greater legal risk when engaging with vessels subject to sanctions lists. Companies will likely accelerate enhanced due diligence on counterparties, ownership structures, and voyage histories to avoid exposure.
Comparison & Data
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Vessel | M/T Skipper (IMO 9304667), formerly Adisa |
| Warrant signed | November 26, 2025 |
| Boarding/Seizure | December 10, 2025 |
| Key statutes cited | 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982, 2332b(g)(5), 2339B(a)(1) |
| Designated groups | Hizballah; IRGC–Qods Force (IRGC-QF) |
The table summarizes core factual milestones and legal authorities associated with this seizure. Past maritime seizures with sanctions links have varied in outcome: some led to forfeiture and criminal charges, while others resulted in administrative actions or diplomatic resolutions. The presence of a signed warrant and coordinated prosecutorial plan increases the likelihood of formal forfeiture proceedings and court adjudication in D.C.
Reactions & Quotes
Federal leadership framed the seizure as a targeted law-enforcement measure against networks that finance terrorism. Officials emphasized interagency cooperation and sanctions enforcement as central to the action and its intended deterrent effect.
We remain committed to intercepting ghost vessels and sanctioned cargoes and to supporting efforts to make the world safer.
U.S. Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro (public statement)
DOJ commentary highlighted prosecutorial resolve and institutional capacity to pursue complex maritime enforcement. Observers noted the political context of the statement and the emphasis on operational readiness across agencies.
The FBI and partners will continue enforcing U.S. sanctions and imposing costs on states and actors who profit from illicit oil networks.
FBI Director Kash Patel (public statement)
The FBI framed the operation as part of a sanctions enforcement campaign targeting financial flows to Iran-affiliated groups and states. Independent analysts caution that while seizures raise the operational cost for illicit networks, networks adapt with alternate routing and increased use of intermediaries.
Unconfirmed
- Public materials do not fully disclose the precise cargo quantity aboard M/T Skipper at the time of seizure; remaining details on cargo manifest have not been released.
- Open-source records and the unsealed warrant do not yet fully specify the vessel’s ultimate commercial beneficiaries or the complete chain of beneficial ownership.
- There is no public confirmation in the unsealed materials that the governments of Venezuela or Iran directly authorized the shipment; liaison and facilitation claims remain subject to further evidentiary development.
Bottom Line
The unsealing of the seizure warrant for M/T Skipper marks a concrete enforcement action tying maritime logistics to counterterrorism and sanctions policy. By invoking forfeiture and terrorism statutes and citing OFAC designations, U.S. authorities have set the case on a path toward formal prosecution and possible forfeiture adjudication in federal court.
The case reinforces two trends: first, that maritime networks remain a focus of sanctions enforcement aimed at choking revenue sources for designated groups; second, that successful interdictions require sustained interagency cooperation and legal groundwork. Parties in the shipping, insurance, and trade sectors should expect heightened scrutiny and an accelerating emphasis on provenance, ownership transparency, and sanctions compliance.